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Wei Cui* 
ABSTRACT:  
A prominent strand of recent economic and legal scholarship 
hypothesizes that third-party information reporting (TPIR) is essential to 
modern tax collection.  The slogan, “no taxation without information,” has 
captured researchers’ imaginations and is even often presented as self-
evident truth.  This Article offers a fundamentally different perspective, 
arguing that the emphasis on TPIR is misplaced.  TPIR is used largely in the 
collection of the personal income tax but not of many other types of modern 
taxes.  Even for the personal income tax, TPIR also has close substitutes 
which do not involve information transmission to the government.  
Theoretically, appeals to TPIR are vitiated by the puzzle of payor 
compliance.  And most purported empirical evidence for the effectiveness of 
TPIR fails to provide causal identification. 
I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations of 
modern tax collection, we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal 
intermediaries” in a game of deterrence against tax evaders.  Instead, it would 
be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of social cooperation under the 
rule of law.  The co-evolution of the business firm and modern regulatory 
law may have enabled modern governments to practice precisely “taxation 
without information.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Successfully raising tax revenue is a defining mark of the “state 
capacity” of advanced economies.1  Building effective tax administration is 
 
 1.  See Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property 
Rights, Taxation, and Politics, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1218, 1218 (2009) (commenting on state 
capacity to raise taxes) and sources cited in note 1 therein; Mark Dincecco, The Rise of 
Effective States in Europe, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 901 (2015) (explaining that “effective” states 
“have the extractive capacity to gather enough revenues, and the productive capacity to better 
channel public funds”).  For the thesis that modern “state capacity” helps to explain the 
divergent paths of economic development of nations, see generally TIMOTHY BESLEY & 
TORSTEN PERSSON, PILLARS OF PROSPERITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 
CLUSTERS (2011) (explaining that economic development has long been attributed not just to 
rising incomes, but also to state effectiveness); Daron Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in 
Weak and Strong States, 52 J. MONETARY ECON. 1199 (2005) (summarizing that a weak state 
capacity and lack of taxation power can lead to the problems of less developed nations); 
Pranab Bardhan, State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current 
Literature, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 862 (2016) (taking a broad look at the developmental goals of the 
state). 
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one of the most urgent tasks facing the poorer countries of the world in their 
pursuit of sustainable development.2  These ideas have recently fueled 
extraordinary policy initiatives among many nations, as well as become the 
focus of cutting-edge research in political economy, public economics, 
economic history, and related branches of the social sciences.3  In 2015, the 
one hundred and ninety three United Nations (U.N.) Member States reached 
two comprehensive agreements, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda4 and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.5  Both agendas committed “to 
enhancing revenue administration through modernized, progressive tax 
systems, improved tax policy and more efficient tax collection. . . . [and in 
particular to] strengthen international cooperation to support efforts to build 
capacity in developing countries . . . .”6  A slew of major international 
projects were launched on the sidelines of the Addis Ababa Conference and 
in its aftermath, involving the coordination of international organizations 
that previously operated separately in this policy area.7  In the meantime, 
 
 2.  See U.N., Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on 
Financing for Development, U.N. DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://sustainablede
velopment.un.org/frameworks/addisababaactionagenda [hereinafter Addis Ababa Action] 
[https://perma.cc/WYH2-5LGF] (explaining that “significant additional domestic public 
resources. . . . will be critical to realizing sustainable development and achieving the 
sustainable development goals”).  See generally, Michael Keen, Taxation and Development—
Again (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 12/220, 2012) (explaining how tax and 
development issues have been a primary concern of the IMF); INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
CURRENT CHALLENGES IN REVENUE MOBILIZATION: IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE (2015), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/020215a.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4CA-RDTG] 
(stating that achieving tax compliance has been a priority for the developing world).   
 3.  See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Taxation and Development, in 5 
HANDBOOK OF PUB. ECON. 51 (A. J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2013) (asking how countries move 
to raise a greater percentage of their GDP from taxes); Daron Acemoglu & James A. 
Robinson, Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in 
Historical Perspective, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1167 (2000) (looking at how extending voting rights 
relates to future wealth redistribution); Dincecco, supra note 1 (highlighting how tax 
collection leads to successful state development); Henrik J. Kleven et al., Why Can Modern 
Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries, 83 
ECONOMICA 219 (2016) [hereinafter KKS] (looking at how third party information reporting 
increases tax enforcement). 
 4.  U.N., supra note 2. 
 5.  U.N., Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, U.N. 
DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015
/transformingourworld [https://perma.cc/8DER-NY9M]. 
 6.  U.N., supra note 2, art 2, 22.  
 7.  For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched the Tax Inspectors 
Without Borders project to “help developing countries bolster domestic revenues by 
strengthening their tax audit capacities.”  Press Release, United Nations, Tax Inspectors 
without Borders: OECD and UNDP to Work with Developing Countries to Make Tax Audits 
More Effective (July 13, 2015).  Moreover, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary 
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questions such as why developing countries tax so little and how developed 
countries can tax so much now draw the attention of some of the most 
innovative and influential social scientists.8  These intellectual developments 
can be seen as complementary to the global policy initiatives: if raising tax 
revenue is indeed crucial to the path to prosperity for all nations in the world, 
a framework for understanding the institutional foundations of modern tax 
collection is clearly in order. 
Much of the recent, highly prominent social science research on the 
underpinnings of the tax collection capacity of advanced economies has 
converged on a simple, seemingly obvious line of reasoning.  To collect tax, 
the government needs information about the taxable income, transactions, 
and other tax attributes of taxpayers.  But the government is always in a 
situation of information asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers: the latter always 
have incentives to hide such information.  The government’s ability to 
overcome such information asymmetry therefore must be crucial for tax 
collection.  And, scholars seem to believe, the most powerful way by which 
such asymmetry has been overcome is through third-party information 
 
Fund (IMF) also launched a new initiative to help developing countries strengthen their tax 
systems.  Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, World Bank and the IMF Launch Joint Initiative 
to Support Developing Countries in Strengthening Tax Systems, U.N. Press Release No. 
15/330 (July 10, 2015), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr15330 
[https://perma.cc/FP6C-6MJP].  The International Tax Compact launched The Addis Tax 
Initiative, in which over 30 countries and international organizations teamed up to strengthen 
international cooperation in strengthening tax administration, and in which participants 
commit to “collectively double their technical cooperation in the area of domestic revenue 
mobilisation and taxation by 2020.”  Press Release, Int’l Tax Compact, On the Occasion of 
the Launch of the ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE (July 15, 2015) (available at 
https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/documents/Addis-Tax-Initiative_Press-Release.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X65U-MVKC]).  In October 2016, the second meeting of the signatories of 
the Addis Tax Initiative was held in Paris, France.  The meeting finalized the Work Plan for 
2016/17, outlining the key priorities of the Addis Tax Initiative.  Addis Tax Initiative, 2nd 
Meeting of the Signatories of the Addis Tax Initiative, Paris, France, ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE 
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/#slider-2 [https://perma.cc/5C46-7XSG].  
More recently, the OECD, IMF, WB and U.N. announced “The Platform for Collaboration 
on Tax.”  See IMF ET AL., The Platform for Collaboration on Tax: Concept Note (Working 
Paper, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pdf/pr16176.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/T694-VBEP] (describing a new platform for international collaboration on tax 
issues).  A report was prepared for the G20 Finance Ministers in the framework of the 
Platform for Collaboration on Tax.  See IMF ET AL., ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN BUILDING TAX CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-external-support-in-building-tax-
capacity-in-developing-countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/593W-JZ2K] (recommending ways 
countries can implement technical assistance programs and contribute funds for tax projects). 
 8.  See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Why Do Developing Countries Tax So 
Little?, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (2014); KKS, supra note 3; Henrik J. Kleven, How Can 
Scandinavians Tax So Much?, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 77 (2014).  
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reporting (“TPIR”).9  In the boldest formulation of this idea, Henrik Kleven, 
Claus Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez claim that TPIR is a defining feature of 
modern taxation.10  In other words, mechanisms for transmitting taxpayer 
information to the government represent the institutional foundations of 
modern tax collection.  To support this bold conjecture, a small but “rapidly 
growing” empirical literature11 has emerged that claims to offer novel 
evidence for the power of TPIR.12  The slogan, “no taxation without 
information,” not only has captured researchers’ imaginations but is often 
even presented as self-evident truth.13 
Indeed, to many U.S. scholars and policymakers, this claim may seem 
quite familiar.  U.S. policymakers, for example, have long been interested in 
narrowing the “tax gap,” or the discrepancy between the tax revenue that is 
 
 9.  As the author of one widely-cited study that purports to provide empirical support 
for this intuitive reasoning puts it:  
A fundamental constraint for taxation is that governments need to be able to 
observe transactions in order to impose a tax on them.  A growing literature 
therefore argues that understanding information flows is central to effective 
taxation.  When governments imperfectly observe transactions, important 
differences emerge between forms of taxation that are equivalent in standard 
models of taxation but differ in the information they generate for the government.  
Third-party reporting, verifiable paper trails, and whistle-blowers are thought to 
play an important role in facilitating tax enforcement. 
Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the 
Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2539 (2015) (citations omitted). 
 10.  KKS, supra note 3, at 219. See infra Part I.   
 11.  The description of this empirical literature as “rapidly growing” is borrowed from 
Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax 
Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1–19, 2 (2017), discussed in detail in Part III infra.  For a 
summary review, see Joel Slemrod, Tax Compliance and Enforcement: New Research and its 
Policy Implications 34–42s.3.3 (Ross Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 1302, 2016) 
(summarizing various research on the evidence relating to third-party information gathering).  
For examples of some widely cited studies, see Carrillo et al., Dodging the Taxman: Firm 
Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, 9(2) AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 144 (April 
2017) (looking at the effects of non-credible tax enforcement when Ecuadorian firms were 
notified of revenue discrepancies); Henrik J. Kleven, et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? 
Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651 (2011) (analyzing 
a tax experiment where half the participants were audited and the rest were not); Pomeranz, 
supra note 9 (emphasizing the importance of gathering information to collecting taxes); 
Miguel Almunia & David Lopez-Rodriguez, Under the Radar: The Effect of Monitoring 
Firms on Tax Compliance (Warwick Econ. Res., Paper Series No. 1070, 2015) (looking at the 
tax compliance effect from firm activity information trails); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as 
Tax Auditors (London Sch. Econ. & Pol. Sci., Working Paper, 2016) (investigating the 
enforcement effect of the wider availability of third-party information gathering).  
 12.  In this Article, I will use “information reporting,” “third-party reporting,” and 
“TPIR” interchangeably. 
 13.  Pomeranz, supra note 9.  
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collected and the revenue that ought to be collected.14  And greater 
information reporting has often been considered as a key approach to 
achieving this goal.15  Although whether the scope of information reporting 
should be expanded has been a matter of century-long debates,16 important 
legislative actions taken in 2008 have given greater emphasis to TPIR.17  
Since 2011, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has required credit card 
companies and payment settlement entities such as eBay to report payments 
made to individuals and businesses.18  Financial institutions are also now 
under the obligation to furnish information about the tax basis of securities 
to taxpayers and the government to determine gains or losses on the sale of 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Understanding the Tax Gap, IRS (Mar. 2005), https://www.irs.gov/new
sroom/understanding-the-tax-gap [https://perma.cc/6N4M-NRA6] (last updated Sept. 27, 
2017) (explaining the components of the tax gap). 
 15.  Both the economic and legal literatures on tax compliance in the United States are 
very large and not possible to review here.  For recent legal scholarship, see, e.g., Joseph 
Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506 
(2007) (focusing on how the cash economy relates to the problem of the tax gap); Leandra 
Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information 
Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Reducing 
Information Gaps] (proposing factors for evaluating information reporting requirements); 
Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps] (arguing that 
tax law can and does promote compliance by implementing structural mechanisms such as 
withholding taxes).   
 16.  See, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, What a History of Withholding Tells Us About The 
Relationship Between Statutes and Constitutional Law, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (2014) 
(viewing the relationship between statutes and constitutional law from the angle of a statute 
that implemented tax withholding); Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to 
Cornerstone of Administrative Practice”: Social Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax 
Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 144 (2016) (giving an overview of the development of tax 
withholding); Joseph J. Thorndike, Wall Street, Washington, and the Business of Information 
Reporting, 110 TAX NOTES 787 (Feb. 13, 2006), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.
nsf/cf7c9c870b600b9585256df80075b9dd/a518ae7d8d5eaf23852571360068fc5e?opendocu
ment [https://perma.cc/9VWH-Z9GR] (giving an overview of the history of tax information 
reporting in the U.S.).  
 17.  See, e.g., Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 
403, 122 Stat. 3765, 3854–58 (2008) (imposing additional reporting requirements on brokers 
for certain securities transactions); Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-289, § 3091(a), 122 Stat. 2654, 2908-11 (2008) (imposing an annual reporting 
requirement on payment settlement entities who make reportable payment transactions in a 
given calendar year). 
 18.  I.R.C. § 6050W (2008).  See infra Part III for a discussion of empirical literature 
analyzing the impact of credit card and third-party settlement entity reporting.  See also, Shu-
Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion 
Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56 (2017) (looking at Uber drivers’ understandings of taxes and 
deductions).  
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securities.19  Proposals to further expand TPIR continue to be advanced.20  
Most importantly, the ever-expanding computing capacities of modern 
digital economies make the recording and transmission of transactional 
information to tax collectors easier and easier, which in turn seems to 
promise more effective government control of taxpayer information.21 
This Article contributes to these vibrant intellectual and policy 
discussions by offering a fundamentally different perspective.  Much recent 
scholarship, I argue, has mischaracterized the role of information reporting, 
which has also led to increasing confusions about the institutional basis of 
modern tax collection.  To develop this perspective, I first engage in a de-
bunking exercise, aimed at exposing weaknesses in the arguments and 
evidence adduced for the importance of TPIR.  I show that TPIR is largely 
used in the collection of the personal income tax, and plays no role in most 
other types of modern taxes.22  Moreover, although information reporting and 
withholding are crucial to the collection of the personal income tax, to 
portray them as overcoming pre-existing information asymmetries between 
the government and taxpayers relies on legal artifices.23  I also show that the 
emphasis on TPIR fails to explain why payors specifically, and business 
organizations generally, would comply with the tax law.24  In particular, the 
prevalent belief that payor withholding or information reporting generates 
self-enforcing compliance dynamics is both practically unconvincing and 
theoretically naïve.  Finally, most purported evidence for the effectiveness 
of TPIR is based on flawed empirical inferences.25 
These de-bunking arguments demonstrate that TPIR cannot play the 
explanatory role that social scientists have assigned it:  at least until the 
present, giving governments effective access to taxpayer information 
through third parties does not explain the success of modern tax 
administration.  The arguments highlight previously neglected weaknesses 
in an apparent scholarly consensus:  what many social scientists are 
increasingly coming to use as “stylized facts” (to motivate further theorizing 
and empirical work) actually involve grave misconceptions about the basis 
 
 19.  I.R.C. § 6045(g) (2015). 
 20.  See, e.g., James Alm & Jay A. Soled, Improving Tax Basis Reporting for 
Passthrough Entities, 143 TAX NOTES 809, 810 (May 19, 2014) (arguing that “the time has 
come to extend basis reporting beyond marketable securities and to require pass-through 
entities” to do the same). 
 21.  Kleven, supra note 8, at 81 (“[T]he gradual transition from cash to credit card 
transactions may eventually eliminate most tax evasion even for self-employed individuals.”); 
James Alm & Jay A. Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 521 (2017)  
 22.  See infra Part I. 
 23.  See infra Part II.A. 
 24.  See infra Part II.B. 
 25.  See infra Part II.C. 
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of modern tax administration.  This is the first major contribution of the 
Article. 
In a second set of arguments, I articulate a new way of looking at the 
feasibility of TPIR, in terms of when information about the mutual identities 
of market participants is likely to be transmitted through market 
mechanisms.  This perspective defines the limits of TPIR more sharply and 
parsimoniously than previous approaches, and suggests that TPIR will tend 
to be incomplete with respect to business income.26  I illustrate this 
perspective through an important recent study of the effect of TPIR by credit 
card companies on U.S. taxpayers,27 and, drawing on the same study, provide 
an explanation of how the incompleteness of TPIR renders it an ineffective 
tool in limiting tax evasion.28  This is the second major contribution of the 
Article. 
Finally, I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations 
of modern tax collection, we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal 
intermediaries” in a game of deterrence against tax evaders.  Instead, it would 
be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of social cooperation under the 
rule of law.  If firms enable social cooperation, but do so only with the 
support of a legal system, then compliance with law in business operations 
can often be expected.  There need not be anything special about compliance 
with tax law in particular, and any valid explanation of why firms comply 
with the tax law is unlikely to be distinct from explanations of the 
phenomenon of business compliance with the law in general.29  I argue that 
this explanatory strategy is more consistent with the history of modern 
taxation — in particular, the fact that labor and workplace regulations were 
implemented well before the adoption of information reporting — than 
explaining tax compliance in terms of TPIR.  The third major contribution 
of the Article is thus to put tax compliance into the context of business 
compliance with the law in general, and connecting both with the theory of 
the firm. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I presents some important 
historical facts that have emboldened economists to hypothesize that TPIR 
is the linchpin of modern taxation.  It then contrasts this bold hypothesis with 
a much more cautious view, which holds TPIR to be a derivative 
phenomenon.  Part II offers a series of arguments for the latter view, 
identifying weaknesses in both the conceptual arguments and empirical 
evidence for the relevance of TPIR.  Part III sets out a new theory about the 
limitation of information reporting, and shows how this theory is consistent 
 
 26.  See infra Part III.A.  
 27.  See infra Part III.B. 
 28.  See infra Part III.C. 
 29.  See Part V infra. 
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with recent empirical evidence from the U.S. on the limited impact of TPIR.  
Parts IV and V then contrast the conceptions of firms as “fiscal 
intermediaries” and as sites of social cooperation.  Part IV highlights the 
inadequacies of the former.  Part V sketches out the latter conception and its 
promise both in terms of historical plausibility and theoretical coherence.  
Part VI briefly discusses some of the policy implications of the arguments in 
Parts I-V.  A brief conclusion then follows. 
I. INFORMATION REPORTING: THE LINCHPIN OF MODERN 
TAXATION? 
Political economists who view taxation as a core component of modern 
state capacity emphasize that richer countries tax more, and any given 
country tends to tax more as it gets richer.30  In a recent, influential paper, 
Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (abbreviated below as “KKS”) show that these 
patterns are driven entirely by countries’ adoption of what they call “modern 
taxes.”31  They include in the definition of “modern taxes” personal and 
corporate income taxes, the value-added tax (VAT), and payroll taxes and 
social security contributions.32  By contrast, “traditional taxes” are defined 
as all other taxes, including property taxes, inheritance taxes, excise and sales 
taxes, custom duties, etc.33  Examining data from 2005 regarding 29 OECD 
countries and 43 non-OECD countries, they show that there exists a clear 
positive correlation between (i) GDP per capita and (ii) the ratio of revenue 
from modern taxes to GDP, but there is no correlation between GDP per 
capita and the ratio of revenue to GDP from traditional taxes34 (see Figure 1 
below).  Further, using data for 14 advanced economies over a 160-year time 
horizon, they show that again, the growth in tax revenue in these countries 
over time is driven entirely by growth in “modern taxes,” with no long-run 
increase (and typically a weak decline) in “traditional taxes” (see Figure 2 
below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30.  Besley & Persson, supra note 8, at 102; Besley & Persson, supra note 3, at 56; KKS, 
supra note 3, at 221; Kleven, supra note 8, at 77-78.  
 31.  KKS, supra note 3, at 223. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See id. (“[T]he relationship between taxes and development across countries is 
driven by a stark variation in tax structure across countries.”) (emphasis in the original). 
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Figure 1: Correlations between GDP and Revenue from “Modern” and 
“Traditional” Taxes35 
 
KKS offer an interpretation for these historical patterns that has 
gained great popularity among political economists studying tax 
administration.36  They postulate that in any country, the growth of tax 
revenue is constrained by the enforceability of taxes, which depends on the 
availability of taxpayer information to the government.37  All “modern taxes” 
are basically taxes in respect of which the “enforceability constraint” has 
been loosened or overcome, through the mechanism of “third-party 
reporting.”38  By this latter term, KKS mean arrangements whereby firms act 
as intermediaries to collect information about other taxpayers and transmit 
such information to the government.39  They argue that when firms get 
sufficiently large, they are more likely to act reliably as such intermediaries, 
because the risk of firms’ being caught cheating increases as firm size 
grows.40  Therefore, roughly speaking, they present a picture where the 
growth of firm size in an economy causes “third-party reporting” to become 
more reliable, which in turn makes taxes more enforceable, and the optimal 
level of taxation more achievable. 
That large firms tend to be more compliant with the tax law (and 
other types of law) is an important, but not uncommon, observation.41  What 
 
 35.  Id. at 224.   
 36.  See sources cited supra note 11.  
 37.  KKS, supra note 3, at 219-20. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  This thesis is also advanced in Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Putting Firms 
into Optimal Tax Theory, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 130 (2006). 
 40.  For a critique of this aspect of KKS, see infra Part IV.  
 41.  See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21, at 543-47 (observing that the workforce has 
concentrated in large firms, where tax compliance is high).  KKS show, using recent data from 
50 countries, that tax revenue and share of workforce in large firms are positively correlated 
across countries.  KKS, supra note 3, at 225–26. 
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KKS’s theory adds to such observation is the contention that this matters for 
the capacity of governments to collect tax revenue because it helps solve a 
pre-existing problem of information asymmetry, i.e. the government’s lack 
of information about ultimate taxpayers such as individual income-earners.42 
 
Figure 2: Revenue Composition over Time for Select Countries43 
 
 
Other scholars have recently offered explanations of modern tax 
compliance in a similar spirit.  That is, they first postulate information 
asymmetry as the most important kind of enforceability constraint for taxes, 
and then identify exogenously given types of economic development that 
relax such constraint.  For example, Anders Jensen claims that because 
economically more developed countries have larger sectors of formal 
employment, they are able to make greater use of TPIR (with respect to wage 
income), and therefore more successfully overcome the information 
asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers.44  Roger Gordon and Wei Li argue that since 
tax collection depends on audits and the effectiveness of audits depends on 
 
 42.  KKS also provide a theory of why large firms are more compliant that focuses on 
the increasing risk of being exposed by whistle-blowers.  KKS, supra note 3, at 220.  Part IV 
infra argues, on the contrary, that many other explanations may be at play and are much more 
relevant.  
 43.  Id. at 225.  KKS provide comparable historical information for other industrial 
economies in the Online Appendix to their article.  
 44.  Anders Jensen, Employment Structure and the Rise of the Modern Tax System (Nov. 
2015) (unpublished working paper) (available at https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/f
iles/TSE/documents/sem2016/jobmarket/jmp_jensen.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H57-PUQP]).  
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the existence of paper trails, the level of development of a country’s financial 
sector will substantially determine the country’s capacity of tax collection.45 
However, while the purported centrality of TPIR to modern tax 
compliance has become commonplace among many scholars, careful 
reflection suggests that the above evidence is actually consistent with 
opposite view, namely that the use of TPIR is quite limited in tax 
administration in advanced economies.  To start, there is no obvious way in 
which the corporate income tax is enforced through TPIR.  Corporations 
report income and deductions largely on the basis of their own accounting 
records.  This is illustrated in the United States by regulatory rules that 
specifically exempt corporations from information reporting requirements 
that are applicable to payments to individuals: businesses that purchase 
services worth more than $600 a year from a service provider generally need 
to report such payments to the IRS, but not if the provider is a corporation.46  
The same corporate exemption applies to the payment of interest and 
dividends.47 
The value added tax (VAT), which is a large source of revenue in 
most countries (although not in the U.S., which has not adopted a VAT), also 
does not involve information reporting.48  Under the VAT, firms—which are 
nominally the taxpayers—charge VAT on goods and services sold to other 
firms and to individuals, and firms engaged in businesses may claim tax 
credits for the VAT that they have been charged on input purchases.49  They 
then remit any net VAT amount—tax charged on sales minus input tax 
credits—to the government (hence the term “value added”).  However, firms 
generally do not transmit information about payments to and specific 
transactions with vendors and customers to the government, but instead 
aggregate transaction information into lines on simple tax returns.50 
 
 45.  Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and 
a Possible Explanation, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 855 (2009).  Gordon and Li view financial 
institutions primarily as the depository of information to which the government may have 
access, rather than intermediaries that automatically transmit such information to the 
government.  However, the literature on TPIR (cited in note 11 supra) has treated Gordon and 
Li’s work as reaching kindred conclusions.  See infra Part IV for a critique of conceptions of 
the firm both as intermediaries and as depositories of information.  
 46.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(p)(1) (2017). 
 47.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2017). 
 48.  KKS acknowledge this point in an endnote, but refer to the fact that the VAT creates 
a paper trail.  KKS, supra note 3, at 242–43 n.8.  The existence of a paper trail does help 
audits, but it does not automatically provide the government with any information before an 
audit.  Cf. Alm & Soled 2016, supra note 21 (contrasting information reporting and audits).  
 49.  See generally ALAN SCHENK ET AL., VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
1–46 (2d ed. 2015) (giving a general overview and history of the VAT).  
 50.  See generally id. at 92–186 (examining the supply chain and tax credits in the VAT 
context). 
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The prevalence of TPIR is really most pronounced in the individual 
income tax context, and only for wage and passive investment income.  U.S. 
workers, for example, receive W-2 forms each year from their employers 
regarding their wage income and the federal, state as well as social security 
taxes that have been withheld from such income.  U.S. investors receive 1099 
forms regarding their dividend, interest, capital gain, and certain other types 
of passive investment income.  Social security and pension payments, which 
one can also think of as forms of passive investment income, are subject to 
TPIR as well.  These types of income represent a very substantial portion of 
the U.S. individual income tax base, and therefore TPIR may appear to be 
thoroughly built into the tax.  But, in reality, that is not the case.  The 
practical and political difficulties of extending information reporting beyond 
the contexts of employment and passive investment income are well-
known.51  The most important examples of information reporting outside 
these contexts are the long-standing requirement to report business payments 
made to independent contractors providing services,52 and the much more 
recent requirements for credit card companies and other payment settlement 
entities to report sales settled by non-cash means.53  The effectiveness of 
these two types of information reporting is still controversial; Part III infra 
will specifically review recent empirical evidence for the (in)effectiveness 
of credit-card reporting.  But few would disagree that TPIR with respect to 
individual business income is largely incomplete.54 
Overall, therefore, it is fair to say that TPIR is used very little in the 
corporate income tax, VAT, and the taxation of individual business income, 
while it is used with respect to an individual’s wage and passive financial 
income.  Even in the United States, which relies on the personal income tax 
for revenue to a much greater extent than other OECD countries,55 sales and 
property taxes and corporate income taxes (none of which generally relies 
 
 51.  See sources cited in note 16 supra (describing the long and difficult process of how 
income tax withholding became accepted).  See also, Joseph J. Thorndike, Do We Have a Tax 
Compliance Crisis in Washington?, TAX HISTORY PROJECT (2009) (calling for all politicians 
on Capitol Hill to release their tax returns); Joseph J. Thorndike, The Income Tax Is 
Inquisitorial—Get Over It, TAX ANALYSTS BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.tax
analysts.org/tax-analysts-blog/income-tax-inquisitorial-get-over-it/2013/01/29/168416 
[https://perma.cc/L6B8-XEUT] (describing Italy’s intrusive tax reporting measures and 
explaining that income tax collection has always been somewhat intrusive). 
 52.  I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2017). 
 53.  I.R.C. § 6050W (2017). 
 54.  See Bankman, supra note 15 (analyzing the underreporting and underpaying of tax 
in the individual business sector); Carrillo et al., supra note 11 at 162 (concluding that some 
Ecuadorian firms in a study may have preferred to underreport costs and remain in the 
informal sector); Slemrod et al., supra note 11 (explaining that tax enforcement for small 
businesses is more challenging than for large firms).  
 55.  OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS 2016 - THE UNITED STATES (2016), available at 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV82-Q3PJ].  
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on TPIR) generate about 36% of total government revenue.56  Another 24% 
of total government revenue comprises social security contributions, and as 
discussed in Part II.A, at least half of this revenue (and maybe the entirety of 
it) can be characterized as not involving TPIR.57  Thus emphasizing TPIR 
seems to privilege, without obvious justification, (certain elements of) the 
individual income tax.  A more neutral characterization seems to be that it is 
business organizations that play essential roles in collecting all modern taxes: 
they are intermediaries (third parties) in respect of several types of taxable 
individual income, but are taxpayers in their own right in respect both of 
taxable individual business income and of other taxes. 
This, however, is not how scholars — not just economists but also 
legal scholars — have written about third-party reporting.58  The standard 
view is that, first, TPIR is crucial for tax collection on wage and passive 
financial income, and second, the practical limitations on third-party 
reporting for other types of (individual taxable) income may be overcome, 
when the cost of compliance can be sufficiently reduced.59  If this is correct, 
the present limitations of TPIR are a matter of mere detail, while the power 
of TPIR is the more basic “stylized fact” that is significant for social science. 
In the following two Parts, I argue against this standard view in two 
ways.  Part II argues that TPIR is a derivative component in modern tax 
administration.  Part III offers an explanation of why information reporting 
would generally not work outside the wage and passive investment income 
context.  The explanation implies that there are hard limits to the 
completeness of information reporting, which in turn constrains its utility. 
II. INFORMATION REPORTING AS A DERIVATIVE INSTITUTION 
To properly evaluate the significance of TPIR, three basic facts, to 
which the existing literature has given inadequate attention, must be taken 
into account.  First, where it is applied in modern tax collection, TPIR often 
has close substitutes that would not support the claim that tax collection is 
conditioned on the transmission of taxpayer information to the government.60  
These substitutes show that the dependence of taxation on information 
transmission is an illusion.61  Second, the appeal to TPIR leaves it mysterious 
why payors would comply with reporting obligations instead of colluding 
with payees.62  Third, although some evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR 
 
 56.  Id. (computations based on 2013 and 2014 data). 
 57.  See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.  
 58.  See infra Part III.A for the discussion of legal scholars’ views on TPIR. 
 59.  See infra Part III.A for the discussion of legal scholars’ views on TPIR. 
 60.  See infra Part II.A. 
 61.  See infra Part II.A. 
 62.  See infra Part II.B. 
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is routinely cited, none of such evidence identifies the causal effect of TPIR 
on compliance.63 
A. The Illusion of Information Transmission 
The effective use of information reporting in the income tax context 
is observed mainly for wage and passive financial income.  Reflection 
suggests that these components of the individual income tax base are 
distinctive in the following way: third parties — namely payors of wage, 
dividend, interest, etc. — possess both near-complete information about the 
specific items of income and control over their payment.64  But for any item 
of income such that there is a payor that possesses both complete information 
about it and control over its payment, information reporting is only one 
among several ways in which the government can collect tax. 
One clear alternative is final withholding.  For example, under the 
final withholding systems adopted in many European countries today, 
employers simply deduct tax from wage payments, and employees do not 
have to file income tax returns themselves.65  Similarly, banks paying interest 
and corporations distributing dividends simply withhold tax on interest and 
dividend payments at flat rates, without the need for individual taxpayers to 
report the receipt of such payments.66  Under final withholding, even though 
the recipients of income are nominally the taxpayers, they generally have no 
compliance obligations with respect to the income subject to withholding.  
Any information transmitted to the government simply helps the latter 
determine whether the payors have performed withholding correctly.  In 
other words, third parties do not transmit information to the government in 
order to help the latter monitor the compliance of ultimate taxpayers. 
There is in fact a more complete substitute for information reporting.  
For any item of income that could be subject to final withholding, an 
equivalent tax can be imposed simply as an excise tax on the payer.  In the 
U.S., a contemporary example of this is the “social security taxes” imposed 
by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) portion of the Internal 
Revenue Code.67  Under the FICA tax regime, taxes “with respect to 
 
 63.  See infra Part II.C. 
 64.  In Part II.D infra, I argue that it is specific economic conditions and legal 
conventions that enable the individual income tax base to be built from these types of income. 
 65.  For a comparative review of the practice of final withholding on wage income and 
financial income, see U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, REP. TO THE CONG. ON RETURN-FREE TAX 
SYSTEMS: TAX SIMPLIFICATION IS A PREREQUISITE (2003) [hereinafter RETURN-FREE 
SYSTEMS] (conducting an examination of return-free systems in other countries).  
 66.  Id. at 2, 7. 
 67.  I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128. 
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employment” consist of an “excise” tax on employers68 and an “income” tax 
on employees,69 each of which is a percentage of the employees’ wages.  
While the income tax on employees is required to “be collected by the 
employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages 
as and when paid,”70 the excise tax on employers is simply paid by employers 
themselves.  However, from the perspectives of the employer and of the 
government, this distinction between the excise (employer) and withholding 
(employee) portions of Social Security contribution is merely nominal.  They 
involve exactly the same calculations and remittance actions by the same 
parties, namely employers.71  It is also generally believed that they have the 
same economic incidence.72  Thus, although one can think of the withholding 
tax (the “employee portion”) as involving the reporting by a third party (i.e., 
the employer) on the taxable wage of an ultimate taxpayer (i.e., the 
employee), this characterization would not be applicable to the excise tax 
that is administered in an identical fashion. 
Indeed, the equivalence — from an enforcement perspective — 
between a final withholding tax and an excise tax on the payor featured 
prominently in the history of the U.S. tax system.  The first U.S. withholding 
tax, enacted by the 1862 Revenue Act, was applicable to (i) “the interest from 
railroad company bonds and the dividends from railroad company stock[,]” 
(ii) dividends paid by banks, trust companies, savings institutions, and 
insurance companies, and (iii) salaries of federal government employees in 
excess of 600 dollars per year.73  The nominal taxpayers for the tax — the 
persons on whom the tax was imposed — were the payors, not the recipients, 
of interest, dividends and salaries.74  Therefore, whether to label the 1862 tax 
an excise tax on payors or a withholding tax on payees is a choice involving 
little substance.75 
Even more tellingly, the Civil War dividends tax led to the proposal 
in 1894 of the first corporate income tax: because in the nineteenth century 
corporations generally distributed most of their earnings as dividends, the 
 
 68.  I.R.C. §§ 3111-3113. 
 69.  I.R.C. §§ 3101-3102. 
 70.  I.R.C. § 3102.  
 71.  Desai, supra note 16, at 894.  
 72.  See HARVEY ROSEN & TED GEYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 314-15 (8th ed. 2007) (showing 
that excise and withholding portions of Social Security contribution have the same economic 
incidence).  
 73.  Desai, supra note 16, at 873-75.  
 74.  Id. at 874.  However, the payors of dividend and interest were “‘authorized and 
required’” to “‘deduct and withhold from all payments made . . . the said duty or sum . . . .’”  
Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 75.  Because the nominal taxpayers were the payors themselves, the tax base of the 
withholding tax was not treated as part of the income of individual recipients. Id. at 875-76.  
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corporate income tax was little different from a tax on dividends.76  The 
corporate income tax, that is, was a mutation from a withholding tax on 
dividends.  Although one could think of the corporate income tax as 
involving information reporting on shareholders, it is uncommon to literally 
refer to it as such.77  But this point also works the other way: although one 
does not usually think of social security withholding on wage earners as an 
excise tax on the employer, one certainly could, just as the Internal Revenue 
Code explicitly labels the portion of FICA taxes imposed on employers.78 
The underlying point is this: once a certain tax base is determined, 
whom the statute designates as the taxpayer, payor or recipient, is to a 
considerable extent a legal artifice.79  Where a “third party” possesses both 
complete information regarding an item of income belonging to the tax base 
and control over that item of income, then that third party can itself be made 
 
 76.  See generally STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT (2010); Desai, supra note 16, at 882, n.107 
(“T]he tax on corporate income was simply the Civil War dividends tax in a new guise. . . . 
[T]he concept of ‘withholding’ of the stockholder’s income tax at source had taken a small 
step toward the creation of a new and distinct concept: the corporate income tax.”) (citation 
omitted).  
 77.  Desai, supra note 16, at 882, n.107 (“Although there was a clear sense that taxing 
the income of an individual owner of shares at the corporate level was primarily grounded on 
the increased likelihood of collecting the tax, the idea that a corporate income tax was simply 
a ‘withholding’ of the shareholders’ income eventually gave way.”) (citation omitted). 
 78.  I.R.C., supra note 68. 
 79.  The equivalence between a withholding tax on the recipient of a payment and an 
excise tax on the payor is a well-known aspect of tax design and has many illustrations not 
only in the U.S. but also in the tax systems of other countries.  A contemporary example of a 
tax on wage income imposed on employers is the Australian fringe benefits tax, imposed on 
employers for in-kind compensation for employees.  HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, 
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2010), at Part II.B.1.  
Each of South Africa, Sweden, France, and Belgium has enacted taxes on corporations on 
their profit distributions that are the equivalent of withholding taxes on dividends.  Juliana 
Benamran, France - Corporate Taxation § 6.1, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (July 21, 2016), 
https://online.ibfd.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_fr_chaphead.html&
WT.z_nav=Navigation [https://perma.cc/VD5N-RB7E].  Gauthier Cruysmans, Belgium - 
Corporate Taxation § 6.1, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (July 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd. 
org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_be_chaphead.html&WT.z_n
av=Navigation [https://perma.cc/9W42-ADY5].  Johann Hattingh, South Africa - Corporate 
Taxation § 1.1.3, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (June 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd.org
/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_za_chaphead.html&WT.z_nav=Navigatio
n [https://perma.cc/VXQ5-Y76K].  Emma Nilsson, Sweden - Corporate Taxation § 6.1, 
COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (April 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=
/collections/cta/html/cta_se_chaphead.html&WT.z_nav=Navigation [https://perma.cc/R26E-
KK6Y].  Brazil has enacted excise taxes on payors of royalties to replace withholding taxes 
with respect to royalty recipients.  Fernando Tonanni & Bruno Gomes, Brazil - Corporate 
Taxation § 14.6.4., COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (March 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd
.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_br_chaphead.html&WT.z_nav=Naviga
tion [https://perma.cc/46EH-YDXD]. 
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into the taxpayer with respect to such element of the tax base.  There would 
be no need to provide information about a different taxpayer.  If two taxes 
are enforced in the same way, but in terms of legal terminology there is a 
“third party” under one tax but no “third party” under the other tax, the “third 
party” aspect of the first way of enforcing tax is clearly superfluous. 
Just as importantly, consider the question why a government would 
choose, in connection with any item of income, information reporting with 
respect to the recipient rather than excise taxation with respect to the payor.  
The answer is generally that there is some personal circumstance — be it 
progressive tax rates that depend on the recipient’s total income (i.e., not just 
income from particular payments or payors), credits and deductions, 
personal expenses, and so on — to which the payors do not have easy 
access.80  Therefore, such private information would have to come from the 
recipients themselves.  Insofar as such private information is not provided to 
the payors, excises or final withholding are not feasible, and accurate tax 
collection depends on compliance by the ultimate income recipients 
themselves.  But this is just to say that the adoption of information reporting 
as opposed to withholding/excises is precisely premised upon the 
incompleteness of information possessed by payors (third parties).  It is not 
a solution to the incompleteness of information held by the government. 
This point has ample illustrations both historically and 
comparatively.  In the history of U.S. taxation, for instance, there were no 
progressive tax rates for the withholding/excise tax mechanisms under the 
1862 Revenue Act.81  Conversely, progressive income tax rates were 
introduced under the 1913 Income Tax Act, which rendered the withholding 
provisions of the Act infeasible, and information reporting replaced it.82  A 
comparative study carried out by the U.S. Treasury Department showed that 
the extent to which a country’s income tax system takes into account 
individual taxpayer circumstances largely explains why some countries 
adopt final withholding for individual income while others do not.83 
In sum, information reporting becomes relevant only when the tax 
law permits private information to be relevant.  This undermines the pretense 
that there is some necessary, pre-existing information asymmetry — for 
example, between the recipients of wages, salaries, and dividends, on the one 
hand, and the government, on the other — which information reporting 
reduces or overcomes.  Such asymmetry comes into place only when the 
government has made the choice of giving information - private to these 
 
 80.  See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 65.  
 81.  This was perceived to generate horizontal inequities among different taxpayers 
(because the income duty also imposed by the Act contained progressive tax rates through 
exemptions).  Desai, supra note 16, at 876-78. 
 82.  Id. at 884-88. 
 83.  See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 65. 
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recipients - policy significance.  Information asymmetries and information 
reporting are two sides of the same coin. 
B. The Puzzle of Payor Compliance 
There is a different, more basic, reason why information reporting 
offers an inadequate explanation of compliance even in the context of taxing 
individual wage and financial income.  An obvious question arises: what 
accounts for compliance on the part of the “third parties” that perform 
information reporting and/or withholding?  What, for example, prevents 
employers from regularly colluding with employees in under-reporting 
wages, and bargaining with employees for the benefit of the tax savings from 
such underreporting?84  Such collusion is widespread today in developing 
countries.85  It is also prevalent in the informal sectors in developed 
countries: in the U.S., for example, the level of compliance with the “nanny 
tax” is perceived to be low and has remained so for many years.86  It is in fact 
quite visible even in the formal sectors of developed countries: many 
employers and employees push the envelope on what counts as non-taxable 
fringe benefits, on the basis that the IRS is unlikely to conduct audits.87  
Given that there are rarely other “third parties” monitoring the “third party” 
required to perform information reporting, why does the latter comply with 
tax law? 
A typical answer given to this question is that employers can claim 
deductions for wage payments, which lower the employer’s income tax 
liability.  The employee and the employer thus have adverse interests, or 
opposing incentives, with respect to reporting wage payments: while the 
employee stands to lose from employer reporting, the employer gains from 
 
 84.  See, e.g., Gideon Yaniv, Collaborated Employee-Employer Tax Evasion, 47 PUB. 
FIN. 312, 312 (1992) (“Under a tax withholding system, an employer and his employees may 
find it mutually beneficial to strike a bargain under which the former withholds less than the 
taxes due . . . while the latter accepts less than the free market wage rate.”).  
 85.  For a recent study, see Todd J. Kumler et al., Enlisting Employees in Improving 
Payroll-Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 19385, 2013). 
 86.  See Sue Shellenbarger, Family Secret: More Parents are Avoiding the Nanny Tax, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122583716191498477 
[https://perma.cc/MD37-HSTH] (explaining that the rise of the Internet has caused a lot of 
parents to stop paying the nanny tax); Celeste Watkins-Hayes, The Immorality of Evading the 
Nanny Tax, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive
/2014/03/the-immorality-of-evading-the-nanny-tax/359637 [https://perma.cc/J48W-H6GN] 
(“Recent estimates suggest that fewer than 250,000 U.S. households report household 
employee wages, even though occupations like child care . . . are growing . . .”).  
 87.  JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 426 (16th ed. 2012); Yaniv, 
supra note 84, at 313.  
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it.  Information reporting is therefore “self-enforcing.”88  It is also often 
assumed that this reasoning applies to other types of payments.89 
While this answer may be plausible in certain contexts, it both lacks 
empirical generality and is theoretically naïve.  In terms of empirical validity, 
the answer may seem to have appeal in the U.S., where personal income tax 
rates have been relatively low90 and the nominal corporate income tax rate 
high91 since the 1960s.  Therefore, employers’ wage deductions may often 
save more tax dollars than the tax liabilities of employees.  However, even 
in the U.S., there are many situations where payments of income taxable to 
payees are not deductible or generate minimal benefits to payors: examples 
include non-deductible payments such as dividends and personal 
expenditures (e.g. childcare), and deductible payments made by payors 
subject to low or zero effective tax rates (e.g., due to losses, accelerated 
depreciation, or tax exemptions).  Indeed, it is generally believed that the 
effective tax rate of U.S. corporations is far lower than the nominal tax rate,92 
and may well be lower than the individual income tax rate applicable to many 
employees.  And in many OECD countries, the effective tax rate applicable 
to wage income (especially when payroll taxes or social security 
contributions are considered) far exceeds the corporate income tax rate 
applicable to employers.  Therefore, the net potential tax saving from non-
reporting of wage income is quite significant. 
Generally, holding information reporting to be self-enforcing is 
theoretically naïve because it assumes that the parties to the transactions 
(both the party that must declare income and the party that claims expense 
 
 88.  Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1739, 1747, 1751 n.93; 
Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 15, at 711, 729-30. 
 89.  Payors are also subject to penalties for failing to withhold or report to the 
government.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PUB. 55B, DATA BOOK 21 (2016) (Rev. 3-2017) 
(noting that “[t]he IRS audited 0.7% of all individual income tax returns filed in CY 2015, 
and 1.1% of corporation income tax returns (excluding S corporation returns)”).  However, 
with low audit rates, the expected value of such penalties may be very low.  While there are 
far fewer employers than employees in any economy, the number of employers is generally 
still too great for tax authorities realistically to maintain a high rate of audit coverage.  Indeed, 
the audit rate for parties required to perform information reporting is not known to be higher 
than in other areas of tax administration.  Therefore, a high probability of detection through 
audits cannot be what explains payor compliance.  
 90.  U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013 (Nominal and 
Inflation-Adjusted Brackets), TAX FOUND. (Oct. 13, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/us-
federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-
brackets/ [https://perma.cc/T68N-2YEX]. 
 91.  Historical Corporate Top Tax Rate and Bracket: 1909-2014, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 
2, 2015) http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/taxfacts/content/pdf/corpo
rate_historical_bracket.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS5C-NENV]. 
 92.  See Yaniv, supra note 84, at 315 (citing a study showing that in 1982, the average 
effective tax rate of U.S. corporations was 13.1% when the statutory tax rate was 46%).  
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deductions) are subject to similar effective tax rates.  But when this is the 
case, the government precisely collects no net revenue from the transaction: 
the inclusion by the payee is cancelled by the deduction by the payor.93  It is 
when parties are not subject to the same tax rates that the government can 
collect net revenue from a transaction, but then, putting aside transaction 
costs and the failure to reach and maintain collusive bargains, the potential 
will always exist for the parties to collude and lower the net payment to the 
government.  For instance, if an employer’s corporate income tax rate is 
substantially higher than the personal income tax rate applicable to wage 
recipients, an incentive arises for employers and employees to collude to 
over-report wage payments. 
This problem — the pervasive incentives for payor-payee collusion 
— is relevant even if final withholding, excise taxation, or any other 
alternative to information reporting is adopted.  It is thus of fundamental 
significance in theorizing about compliance, and is taken seriously by 
theorists who rigorously model tax compliance.94 
C. Lack of Causal Identification 
The following fact is routinely touted as evidence for TPIR’s 
effectiveness in securing compliance.  In the U.S. and a number of other 
countries, tax administrators study the “tax gap” by conducting audits 
designed to precisely measure the compliance level of a representative 
sample of the population.95  Many of these studies have revealed that the 
taxpayer compliance rate is much higher for wages and passive financial 
income than it is for self-employment income.96  Since wage and passive 
financial income are usually subject to TPIR while self-employment income 
is not, it is argued, higher compliance is produced by TPIR.97 
 
 93.  In other words, the irony of “self-enforcing” mechanisms is that the government can 
never expect to raise any net revenue where they operate. 
 94.  See, e.g., KKS, supra note 3, at 219-24 (analyzing collusion as it pertains to 
compliance); Yaniv, supra note 84 (highlighting the impact of collusion). 
 95.  Kleven et al., supra note 11; Mark D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax Compliance 
and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data Show? 67 NATL TAX J. 531, 536 (2014).  
 96.  Kleven, supra note 8, at 79-83; Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 653; Phillips, supra 
note 95, at 532; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 3744 (REV. 
6-2014), STRATEGIC PLAN FY2014-2017 34 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3
744.pdf [https://perma.cc/64DR-DYUP]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE., U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010 5 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%
202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SHF-AKN7]. 
 97.  See Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 25, 37 (2007) (“Line item by line item, there is a clear positive correlation between the 
rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms such as information reports 
and employer withholding.”). 
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Such inferences from correlation to causation are, however, highly 
unreliable.  Specifically, it is rarely possible to disentangle the use of TPIR 
from two types of confounding factors, which may undermine both the 
internal and external validity of the inferences.  These two factors are (a) the 
nature of the (individual) income and (b) the nature of the payor. 
Consider the first.  As suggested in Part II.A supra (and as will be 
further elaborated in Part III infra), TPIR seems particularly tailored to wage 
and passive investment income.  Yet, governments can often secure 
compliance with tax collection with respect to these types of income without 
relying on TPIR.  For example, most financial transactions create paper (or 
digital) trails, and such documentation trails, as opposed to TPIR, may 
induce compliance with respect to passive financial income.  None of the 
studies purportedly demonstrating the effectiveness of TPIR, however, try to 
distinguish the effect of TPIR from the effect of paper trails.  Yet the 
distinction is important: a paper trail is useful only if the government decides 
to audit taxpayers, while TPIR itself would affect the making of that 
decision. 
Similarly, as argued earlier, tax can be effectively collected from 
wages and financial income through withholding or, equivalently 
administratively, payor excise taxation.  There has been no study to show 
that TPIR is more effective than withholding or excise taxation (or, where 
withholding and information reporting are simultaneously implemented, that 
the latter is effective independently of the former).  This implies that no 
evidence has been produced that “but for” TPIR, the level of compliance 
could not be as high as is actually observed.98 
Consider next the nature of the payor.  In one study analyzing Danish 
taxpayer data, Henrik Kleven and co-authors found that after controlling for 
both whether an item of income is subject to TPIR and whether it is likely to 
be audited, the effect of firm size still has a significant impact on the rate of 
tax evasion.99  They infer from this that “collusion between taxpayers and 
third parties may be important in small firms,” even in Denmark.100  This 
suggests that firm size may matter for compliance independently of the use 
of TPIR.  By contrast, there has been no study investigating the distinct effect 
of TPIR while holding firm size constant.101 
 
 98.  Contrast this with the claim made in Kleven, supra note 8, at 79, that it has been 
shown “empirically that tax enforcement is successful if and only if third-party information 
covers a large fraction of taxable income” (emphasis added). 
 99.  Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 676. 
 100.  Id. at 676 n.27. 
 101.  This is no doubt partly due to the fact that the main studies testing the effectiveness 
of TPIR are based on individual taxpayer returns, and therefore, can typically control only for 
the characteristics of the individual taxpayers.  See sources cited supra note 96. 
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Purported evidence for TPIR’s effectiveness that is not based on 
individual tax return data is even more problematic.  For example, some 
point to the fact that economies with larger formal employment sectors have 
higher tax-to-GDP ratios.102  Yet, these are likely to be economies with 
greater presence of large firms, which are responsible for paying for the bulk 
of wages.103  The compliance of such firms, as opposed to TPIR per se, may 
be the reason for the high level of observed compliance with respect to wage 
income.  The fact that much tax revenue is collected through taxes not 
involving TPIR further weakens the credibility of claims about TPIR’s 
relevance.104 
If there is causation in this area, it is more plausible to regard it as 
lying between the large tax base of wages and financial income in advanced 
economies, on the one hand, and the collection of revenue from such income, 
on the other.  When a large wage and financial income tax base is absent, 
information reporting could have little use.  But once such conventions are 
developed, other collection mechanisms, such as final withholding or payor 
excise taxation, may be deployed instead of information reporting.  The 
differences among these different collection mechanisms do not map onto 
differences in enforcement and are merely nominal.  Therefore, the “third 
party” aspect of information reporting cannot constitute genuine causal 
mechanism. 
III. THE BOUNDARIES OF THIRD-PARTY REPORTING 
Scholars who hold information reporting to be essential to modern 
tax compliance also tend to express great optimism in information 
reporting’s future.105  To them, the benefits of information reporting are 
proven, and its cost can only go down.106  So far, I have questioned whether 
information reporting’s benefits have really been proven.  In this Part, I 
suggest a new way of thinking about how the cost of TPIR determines its 
limits, i.e., why we find third-party reporting in some places and not others.  
Moreover, I discuss some strong evidence of the ineffectiveness of TPIR 
beyond its traditional spheres. 
 
 
 102.  See, e.g., Kleven, supra note 8, at 81-83 (pointing to such a fact). 
 103.  Jensen, supra note 44. 
 104.  See supra Part I. 
 105.  See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21 (providing an example of scholars who believe 
information reporting is beneficial).  See also Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2567 (“[M]echanis
ms that provide information to the government, such as online billing systems or electronic 
receipts . . . may have high returns.”). 
 106.  Id. 
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A. Previous Attempts at Cost-Benefit Analyses of Information 
reporting 
Legal scholars have previously attempted to articulate a framework 
for analyzing the costs and benefits of third-party reporting.107  Yet, the 
predictive power of what they have suggested is limited.  For example, 
Leandra Lederman has described six conditions:108 
a) The party furnishing the information report should be at arm’s-
length from, and should be unlikely to benefit from collusion with, 
the taxpayer. 
b) Only those who possess a bookkeeping infrastructure should be 
required to information report. 
c) Information reporting parties should be fewer in number than 
taxpayers reported on, allowing the government to centralize the 
sources of information. 
d) “Information reporting is most effective when it provides all of the 
information necessary for the government to match the third-party 
report with corresponding amounts on the taxpayer’s return; partial 
reporting reduces enforcement efficiency.” 
e) There should be few ways for the taxpayer to cheaply avoid 
information reporting. 
f) Transactions that do not contribute substantially to the tax gap in the 
absence of information reporting should not be prime targets for 
information reporting. 
It is not hard to see that the predictive power of these six factors is 
weak.  Consider the idea that parties furnishing the information report should 
be unlikely to benefit from collusion.109  In reality, the potential for collusion 
among employers and employees to evade taxes (and for similar collusion 
among other arm’s-length parties) is ever present.110  Nonetheless, this has 
not precluded employer information reporting from being adopted.  
Similarly, it is true that those required to information report generally possess 
a bookkeeping infrastructure and are fewer in number than taxpayers 
reported on.  But these two factors are equally present in contexts where 
third-party reporting is generally not adopted.  Supermarkets and department 
stores possess bookkeeping infrastructures and are fewer in number than 
individual shoppers.  Yet governments do not require retail stores to report 
the individual purchases made by shoppers (although stores may be asked to 
collect sales taxes).  Finally, the principles that there should be limited 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15.  See also Bankman, 
supra note 15. 
 108.  Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1739-41. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining payor compliance challenges). 
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opportunities for cheap avoidance, and that TPIR’s costs should be 
commensurate with its benefits, clearly apply to legal design in general, and 
do not specifically explain the scope of third-party reporting. 
Factor (d) on Professor Lederman’s list, however, does imply a way 
of predicting the use of information reporting.  When there is discrepancy 
between gross payment and taxable income, information reporting by the 
payor needs to be structured to reconcile such discrepancies to be useful.  For 
example, when brokers were only required to report proceeds from sales of 
securities to the IRS, without reporting the tax basis of the securities in 
respect of their owners, the information reported was only of limited 
utility.111  The requirement commencing in 2011 for brokers to report on the 
tax basis of securities thus illustrates a change from incomplete to more 
complete reporting on capital gain and loss.112  Conversely, as we will see 
through the extended discussion of recent credit card reporting in the U.S. 
below,113 when discrepancies between gross payment and taxable income 
cannot be reconciled, the utility of information reporting for the government 
is sharply reduced.114 
Other scholars have also noted the need for information reporting to 
be complete to be effective.115  However, when is information reporting 
likely to be incomplete?  Little attention has been given to answering this 
question.  I will now suggest an answer: information reporting is likely to be 
incomplete whenever the income-generating activity involves many market 
transactions from which agency relationships and financial claims are 
absent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 111.  See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1743-44 
(“Accordingly, this change will likely prove to be a valuable one.”).  
 112.  See id. at 1743 (explaining that the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
enabled comprehensive reporting on securities sales). 
 113.  See discussion infra Part III Section C. 
 114.  See id. (discussing how information reporting may still serve purposes other than 
transmitting information to the government). 
 115.  See Bankman, supra note 15, at 513 (“One problem with this sort of scale-back is 
that as the proportion of transactions subject to third-party reporting declines, the utility of 
each item reported also declines.”); Carrillo et al., supra note 11, at 162 (“In addition, the 
effect of third-party reporting can be limited when such reporting is incomplete and the tax 
authority has limited ability to audit the unreported margins.”); Slemrod et al., supra note 11, 
at 19 (“For information reporting to have a strong effect on tax compliance, it must target a 
noncompliant group of taxpayers and it must subject a large share of their income to 
information reporting.”). 
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B. Agency Relationships, Financial Claims, and Non-Anonymity of 
Transacting Parties 
It appears that all instances of TPIR in the individual income 
taxation context involve either: (i) a relationship of agency, (ii) a contractual 
relationship, especially one establishing a financial claim, or (iii) a 
combination of the two.  For example, employment is an agency relationship.  
Financial income typically arises from financial claims, though in modern 
financial markets financial claims tend to be intermediated by layers of 
agency relationships.116 
Market transactions involving agency relationships and financial 
clams are distinctive in the following respect: they require mutual knowledge 
of the identities of the transacting parties.117  It is the intrinsic nature of an 
agency relationship for the principal and agent to know who each other are.  
Similarly, financial claims by definition persist over time; therefore, the 
parties need the identities of their counterparties to locate them later on.  
Thus, parties that have financial claims against one another generally do not 
remain anonymous.118  By contrast, the sale and purchase of goods and 
services generally transpire in such a way that parties need not know the 
identities of their counterparties, or in any case do not retain information 
about such identities.  Transactions in goods and services require the keeping 
of identities only insofar as they create claims over time (e.g., warranty for 
defective products) or the relationship of agency. 
The distinctiveness of agency relationships and financial 
transactions in terms of the keeping of party identities has, to my knowledge, 
seldom been noted.119  It is, however, related to the claims that law and 
economics scholars have made about the contexts in which parties make 
enforceable contracts.  Polinsky and Shavell, for example, suggest that 
contracts are first needed in “virtually any kind of financial arrangement.”120  
 
 116.  For a recent discussion in the tax literature of such relationships, see Reid Thompson 
& David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership, 67 TAX L. REV. 249 (2014). 
 117.  Government transfers such as low-income support or supplemental income for the 
unemployed, which are often subject to information reporting and/or withholding, are also 
inherently non-anonymous.  Some agency relationships and financial claims may nonetheless 
involve anonymity (e.g., the use of bearer instruments).  So one may think of the presence of 
agency relationships and financial claims as generally necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for the keeping of mutual identities. 
 118.  Where they do, they are connected through a chain of non-anonymous agency 
relationships. 
 119.  See Wei Cui, Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal, 67 U. 
TORONTO LAW J. 301 (2017), Part VI, where I explore the implications of this phenomenon 
for the structure of international taxation. 
 120.  Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 
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For similar reasons, they suggest that parties make enforceable contracts to 
arrange “the supply of customized or specialized goods and services, which 
cannot be purchased on a spot market in a simultaneous exchange for 
money.”121 
The presence of agency relationships or financial claims predicts the 
boundaries of information reporting remarkably well.  In the U.S., most types 
of information reporting are done by parties in agency relationships or 
subject to financial claims.  Reporting by employers and brokers are 
examples of the former; reporting by payors of interest, dividends, social 
security payments, and by partnerships and S-corporations are examples of 
the latter.  Recently introduced reporting by payment settlement entities, 
such as Visa, and third-party settlement entities, such as eBay,122 can be 
viewed as based on both agency and financial relationships.  The major 
deviation from reporting by principals, agents, and parties subject to 
financial claims is reporting by businesses of payments to service providers 
of annual amounts in excess of $600 (i.e., the issuance of 1099-MISC 
forms).123  Even here, the limitation of information reporting to recipients of 
services (as opposed to goods) requires rationalization, which is easily 
suggested by the fact that most such services involve either an agency 
relationship or at least something very close. 
The connection between agency and financial transactions, on the 
one hand, and information reporting, on the other, is straightforward.  In such 
transactions, market participants routinely record payments made to 
identified parties.  All the government has to do in imposing reporting 
requirements is to harness such information.  By contrast, in other 
transactions where parties do not normally keep track of mutual identities, 
obtaining information about such identities and associating transactions with 
them introduces costs not originally present in market activities.  It is this 
kind of cost that policymakers may not find justifiable to impose, especially 
when the information gathered would offer only an incomplete picture of the 
tax base. 
A good illustration of this point is a third-party reporting device that 
has received frequent favorable comments from academics in recent years, 
 
2005), at 14.  This is presumably because such arrangements inherently require performance 
in the future. 
 121.  Id.  Indeed, the relationship of contract itself perhaps always implies non-anonymity 
between the contracting parties.  But non-anonymity may extend to agency relationships 
without contract.  And while there may be many instances of non-agency, non-financial 
contracts, the absence of payment under such contracts (until the time of performance) may 
render them less relevant for income tax purposes.  Hence the claim here that information 
reporting always involves agency relationships and financial transactions can be seen as an 
adaptation of Polinsky and Shavell’s general claim to the tax context. 
 122.  See infra Part III Section C. 
 123.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1. 
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but is perceived to deliver only very mixed results in the real world: inducing 
consumers to report on merchants through the use of lotteries.124  Generally, 
we do not expect merchants to keep information about consumers, for 
reasons just noted.  Suppose, however, that a lottery is established, so that 
consumers who report enough of their receipts from purchases may win a 
prize.  Such a system was implemented in Sao Paolo, Brazil.125  To facilitate 
the lottery, merchants collected social security numbers from consumers, and 
such information was later used for processing lottery claims.126  It is clear 
here that it was the lottery — a type of financial transaction127 — that created 
the need of merchants to collect consumer information.  By contrast, if we 
ask how often merchants (i.e., sellers of ordinary goods and services) need 
social security numbers from their customers, the answer is almost never.128 
Within the income tax context, the logic of agency relationships and 
financial claims helps to explain the scope of information reporting in two 
ways.  First, if income can be computed only after taking deductions into 
account, and if either income, deductions, or both arise from activities 
involving multiple market transactions, information reporting by payors is 
likely to require identity-keeping by market participants who would 
otherwise not keep mutual identities.  The additional social cost of gathering 
 
 124.  For favorable academic comments on consumer lotteries in information reporting, 
see, e.g., Bankman, supra note 15, at 510-11 (noting that lotteries are cheap compliance 
measures); Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1753 (“A creative 
alternative used in some countries is to have consumers’ receipts double as lottery tickets.”); 
Slemrod, supra note 11, at 39-40 (explaining how lotteries incentivize consumers to report 
firm tax evasion); and Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors 35 (London Sch. of Econ. 
and Political Sci., Working Paper, 2016) (“In particular, the paper provides supporting 
evidence that consumers respond to lottery incentives to ask for receipts, which is the most 
common policy reward used by governments to mobilize consumers against tax evasion.”).  
For critical discussion of real-world experience, see, e.g., IMF, supra note 2, at 29-30 
(highlighting the limits of lottery schemes); Jonas Fooken et al., Improving VAT 
Compliance—Random Rewards for Tax Compliance 3 (Eur. Comm’n Taxation Papers, 
Working Paper No. 51-2014, 2014) (“While there is growing interest in the use of tax lotteries 
throughout Europe, the understanding of best practises [sic] and success factors is still 
limited.”).  
 125.  Naritomi, supra note 124, at 11. 
 126.  Id. at 11-15.   
 127.  Many consumer lotteries aimed at improving tax collection involve instantaneous 
lotteries, and thus, simply give incentives to consumers to help create paper trails (e.g., sales 
receipts) as opposed to actually involving them in information reporting.  See Fooken, supra 
note 124 (documenting insights from a workshop that sought to bring together countries with 
experience and those interested in running tax lotteries).   
 128.  Consumers may voluntarily keep information about merchants (for purposes of 
returns, warranties, etc.), but requiring information reporting by consumers on merchants 
would be something different.  It would also violate the conditions of centralization and book-
keeping infrastructure that Lederman identified.  Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, 
supra note 15. 
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and transmitting transactional information would be hard to justify, 
especially if even the aggregate of the transactions may not correctly reflect 
income (given the difference between cash and accrual accounting, between 
ordinary and capital expenditures, and so on). 
Second, agency relationships and relationships of financial claims 
explain the imposition of information reporting requirements even where the 
transactional amounts do not closely track the tax base, i.e., despite the likely 
ineffectiveness of information reporting.  U.S. broker information reporting 
of gross receipts from the disposition of securities before the recent 
introduction of basis reporting is an example of this.  The filing of forms 
1099-MISC and 1099-K is another.  Here, the adoption of information 
reporting can be rationalized at least by its relatively low cost — the 
government is merely harnessing information that market participants 
already possess. 
In summary, TPIR is likely to be adopted only where the incremental 
cost of gathering transaction information (including identities of transacting 
parties) is small relative to business practices in the absence of tax, and 
especially if the additional cost of transmitting such information is matched 
by a distinct benefit for the government in identifying the tax base.  Modern 
economic conditions and income tax law have molded a large portion of the 
individual income tax base to fit these conditions, but much of the rest of the 
tax base of “modern taxes” has never come close to meeting these conditions.  
I believe this account constitutes a more parsimonious description of patterns 
in the actual use of information reporting than previous accounts.  Identifying 
such a systematic pattern should make the effective scope of information 
reporting less of an article of faith. 
C. Recent Evidence: Does Credit Card Reporting Increase 
Compliance? 
The theory just advanced is consistent with the very mixed evidence 
for the effectiveness of TPIR when implemented beyond the realm of wage 
and financial income.  A uniquely authoritative study on this topic was 
carried out recently by economists at the IRS and the University of 
Michigan.129  Slemrod et al. examined how self-employed individual 
taxpayers (Schedule C filers) in the U.S. responded to information reporting 
newly introduced in 2011.  Under the new reporting regime, electronic 
payments received by businesses (e.g., credit card payments and payments 
by online commerce platforms such as eBay) are reported by the firms 
processing these payments.130  This enabled the researchers to carry out a 
 
 129.  Slemrod et al., supra note 11.  
 130.  See Money Crashers, What Online Resellers Need to Know About the 1099-K, U.S. 
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large-scale study: Slemrod et al. matched 2.5 million new information 
returns (1099-Ks) filed in 2012 to the tax returns of over a million Schedule 
C filers.131 
At first glance, the IRS’ capacity to analyze such a large quantity of 
information may bolster one’s confidence that TPIR would help detect and 
deter non-compliance.  However, Slemrod et al.’s study suggests three 
sobering conclusions.  First, the new information reporting regime has not 
detectably increased taxpayer compliance.  Second, the data that the IRS 
possesses about individuals’ business income even under the post-2011 
regime is very incomplete and noisy.  And third, although careful 
econometric analyses establish instances of taxpayers’ strategic behavior in 
response to information reporting, the nature of the strategic behaviors 
detected is difficult to interpret; the data analysis thus does not yield clear 
audit implications. 
1. 1099-K reporting: incompleteness and minimal deterrence effect 
Slemrod et al. first found that at least in the first two years (2011-
12), the introduction of Form 1099-K had no impact on the aggregate net 
income reported by Schedule C filers.132  There was also no detectable 
additional deterrence effect relative to pre-existing information reporting.133  
They concluded that the overall initial deterrence effect of the new form of 
reporting was minimal.134  Rather, the main impact of the introduction of 
Form 1099-K discovered by their study was on a small group of taxpayers 
representing less than ten percent of their sample; the characters and 
behavior of this group are further discussed below.135  But before turning to 
such specific findings, it is important to reflect on Slemrod et al.’s finding of 
 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Apr. 10, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs
/my-money/2012/04/10/what-online-resellers-need-to-know-about-the-1099-k 
[https://perma.cc/687Z-4CZR]; Kelly Phillips Erb, Credit Cards, The IRS, Form 1099-K And 
The $19,399 Reporting Hole, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 11:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/29/credit-cards-the-irs-form-1099-k-and-the-19399-reporting-
hole/#4337ff851ae8 [https://perma.cc/2JZL-9CQQ] (explaining the intricacies of new 
reporting requirements that became effective in 2012). 
 131.  Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 7.  These information returns represented $160 
billion (three percent) of the total $5.3 trillion of receipts reported to the IRS on all 10.3 
million 1099-Ks through the new information reporting program.  
 132.  Id. at 11. 
 133.  Id. at 7-10.  The revenue growth for taxpayers who became subject to information 
reporting for the first time under 1099-K followed similar trends, on average, to other groups 
of taxpayers already subject to prior information reporting (e.g. using 1099-MISC).  The 
trends are also similar for the group of taxpayers not subject to either type of reporting.  Id. at 
12. 
 134.  Id. at 12. 
 135.  See Part III.C.2 infra.  
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minimal deterrence on the overall population.  This seems disappointing, 
especially to those who had advocated for the adoption of credit card 
reporting.  Whatever social costs were incurred in the preparation and 
issuance of 1099-K forms, it appears that no new revenue was raised.136 
This result can be explained in a number of ways.  For instance, the 
most common type of tax evasion is done through cash transactions 
anyway.137  But perhaps equally importantly, even if one disregards tax-
motivated uses of cash, one might be concerned that the scope of credit card 
reporting is insufficiently broad.  Slemrod et al.’s data suggests that for those 
taxpayers subject to 1099-K reporting, more than 85% reported receipts that 
were significantly greater than the amounts shown on the 1099-Ks they 
received — indeed, most taxpayers reported far more — and only fewer than 
five percent reported significantly less.138  Under Slemrod et al.’s theoretical 
assumptions, in the absence of information reporting, taxpayers who are 
predisposed to cheat will under-report business receipts.  When there is 
information reporting, these taxpayers may believe that failing to declare at 
least the amounts of receipts reported on Form 1099-Ks substantially and 
discontinuously increases the risk of audit.  Therefore, such taxpayers would 
report amounts on their Schedule C’s that are at least equal to amounts 
reported on 1099-Ks.  In other words, information reporting creates a floor 
for reported receipts.  When this idea is applied to the real world, however, 
it appears that this floor was binding only for about ten percent of the 
Schedule C filer population.139 
This is consistent with the idea that for most businesses, a substantial 
gap may exist between the volume of all market transactions and the volume 
of transactions for which the parties maintain mutual identities.  Indeed, this 
idea is the basis for the main analytical strategy of Slemrod et al.’s study.  
They assume that amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks will accurately 
represent the total business receipts only for a very small segment of 
taxpayers, e.g., online sellers who derive most of their receipts from the likes 
of eBay, etc.140  Based on this assumption, they hypothesize that among those 
taxpayers whose reported receipts on Schedule C closely match amounts 
reported on Form 1099-Ks, a substantial portion will be taxpayers with “a 
high propensity to under-report receipts prior to the introduction of 
 
 136.  Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 7-10.   
 137.  Id. at 1-2. 
 138.  Id. at 8 (Figure 2); correspondence with Joel Slemrod and Daniel Reck. 
“Significantly” greater or less here means amounts either five percent greater or five percent 
less than the amounts reported on the relevant 1099-Ks.   
 139.  Id. at 10. 
 140.  Id. at 2 (“Bunching may occur because firms believe that reporting receipts above 
the 1099-K amount avoids triggering an audit by contradicting third-party information, or 
because all or virtually all of a firm’s receipts are subjected to credit-card information 
reporting (as may be the case with exclusively online businesses).”). 
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information reporting . . . .”141  In other words, rather than seeing amounts 
reported on Form 1099-Ks as setting a relevant benchmark for truthful 
reporting, close matching between Schedule C and 1099-K receipts should 
be seen as a potential sign of cheating. 
This methodology stands the traditional conception of the benefits 
of information reporting (e.g., in connection with wage and passive financial 
income) on its head.  Under the traditional paradigm, third-party payors 
provide near-complete information about taxable income to the government, 
such that taxpayers are “unable to cheat” on such income.142  For credit card 
reporting, however, third-party information may be so incomplete in respect 
of both taxable receipts and deductible expenses that two consequences 
inevitably follow.  First, credit card reporting may leave plenty of room for 
the under-statement of taxable receipts for taxpayers whose receipts far 
exceed the amounts subject to 1099-K reporting.  Second, even if credit card 
reporting forces some taxpayers to report more taxable receipts than they 
would have reported otherwise, they are not thereby “disabled” from 
cheating, because they can still fudge numbers on the deductions side.  This 
second consequence is illustrated by Slemrod et al.’s finding of taxpayer 
strategic behavior. 
2. Strategic behavior in response to information reporting 
Slemrod et al. postulate that credit card reporting would force some 
taxpayers to report more taxable receipts than they would otherwise.143  But 
two other types of related behavior are also likely.  First, these taxpayers may 
report amounts on their Schedule C’s not much more than, and possibly 
exactly equal to, amounts reported on 1099-Ks.  Second, they may increase 
reported expenses to offset increased reported receipts, because it is more 
difficult to verify expenses than to verify receipts.  When information 
reporting is incomplete, third-party-reported amounts may set a useful floor 
for reported receipts, but they do not provide a useful ceiling for reported 
expenses.  Overall, then, Slemrod et al. imply that if one observes taxpayers 
who (i) file tax returns only when subject to information reporting, (ii) whose 
self-declared receipts largely match third-party reported receipts, and/or (iii) 
whose expenses closely match receipts, such patterns are potentially 
indicative of a propensity towards tax evasion. 
Motivated by such reasoning, Slemrod et al. focused on the 9-10% 
of their taxpayer sample that reported gross receipts within five percent of 
the gross amount on the 1099-K’s issued to them.  This is the group of 
 
 141.  Id. at 2. 
 142.  Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 651-52. 
 143.  Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 4.   
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taxpayers that “bunched” around the point where the ratio of (i) the receipts 
reported on 1099-K forms issued to the taxpayer (denoted “K”) to (ii) gross 
receipts reported on a taxpayer’s Schedule C (denoted “R”) is 1.144  Slemrod 
et al. observe that taxpayers with K/R close to 1 report unusually large 
increases in receipts from 2010 to 2011, which cannot be explained by the 
trend of growth of taxpayers that happen to have a high share of true receipts 
subject to information reporting.  Instead, it is likely that many taxpayers 
with K/R close to 1 reported more receipts after becoming subject to 
additional third-party reporting.  
Slemrod et al. find several other types of evidence of taxpayer 
strategic behavior.  First, taxpayers with K/R close to 1 in 2011 were 
substantially less likely to have filed a Schedule C in prior years.145  Second, 
taxpayers bunching around K/R=1 also reported large increases in expenses, 
which to a great extent offset the increases in reported receipts by this group, 
resulting in little change in net income reported.146  Third, taxpayers 
bunching at where K/R=1 and new Schedule C filers who also receive 1099-
Ks are disproportionately likely to also bunch around the point where the 
ratio of reported expense to receipt is 1.147  Fourth and finally, the authors 
examine the composition of expenses to see precisely where taxpayers 
increased expense reporting to offset increased receipts reporting, and find 
increases occurred primarily in the “Other Expenses” line item.148  In other 
words, the new reported expenses seem opaque in their nature. 
It seems likely, therefore, that some of the “bunching” taxpayers are 
cheating.  The group of taxpayers showing the foregoing “suspect” patterns 
amounts to about one percent of the total population of taxpayers that the 
authors studied.149  This suggests a potential benefit of TPIR for improving 
the IRS’ audit strategies, despite the overall finding that U.S. credit card 
reporting has not yet improved taxpayer compliance.150  If one thinks of the 
IRS’s task of enforcing the law on Schedule C filers as searching for the 
proverbial needle in the haystack, the new regime, it might be suggested, has 
 
 144.  “Bunching” means an abnormal concentration of taxpayers at a point relative to the 
overall distribution of taxpayers along a given dimension.  However, not all taxpayers that 
bunch around K/R=1 deserve suspicion.  Some taxpayers may simply have a high share of 
true receipts subjected to information reporting.  If they report truthfully, their reported 
receipts should largely match third-party reported receipts.  Slemrod et al. confirm the 
presence of such taxpayers.  Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 15. 
 145.  This is the “extensive margin” response to 1099-K.  The authors conservatively 
estimate that Form 1099-K caused more than 20% of taxpayers in this particular group to start 
filing Schedule C’s.  Id. at 12. 
 146.  Id. at 10-18. 
 147.  Id. at 10. 
 148.  Id. at 17. 
 149.  Correspondence with Joel Slemrod and Daniel Reck. 
 150.  Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 15-17. 
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the potential of both reducing the size of the haystack and also increasing the 
size of the needle.  It reduces the size of the haystack by getting the IRS to 
focus on the “bunchers”: 1099-K reporting gives the IRS a specific target 
group to direct its limited enforcement resources.  It also enlarges the size of 
the needle by revealing taxpayers’ strategic behavior, such as new Schedule 
C filing, increased claims of expenses, and matching claims of increased 
expenses and receipts.  Information reporting, in other words, may generate 
footprints for the IRS to follow.151 
However, this optimistic view faces at least two objections. First, 
unlike taxpayers who under-declare wage income compared to amounts 
reported on their W-2s, many “bunchers” displaying “suspect” revenue and 
expense patterns may not be cheating. There are other, benign reasons why 
taxpayers may have increased receipt reporting (including by filing Schedule 
C for the first time) in response to information reporting, while 
simultaneously increasing reported expenses.152  Therefore audits of this 
taxpayer population will need to pick out the “needles” from the irrelevant, 
“needle-like” items.153  Second, Slemrod et al. find that the “bunching” 
taxpayers tend to be significantly smaller than the typical 1099-K 
recipients.154  The revenue potential for devoting audit resources to this group 
is thus limited, and may compare unfavorably with the option of auditing 
larger taxpayers.  In other words, focusing on “bunchers” does not so much 
reduce the size of the haystack as to direct the IRS to an arbitrarily-
determined corner of it.  Therefore, it is not clear that credit card information 
 
 151.  I am grateful to George Yin for discussions of this point. 
 152.  First, prior to information reporting, some taxpayers may have skipped reporting the 
portion of their total receipts that corresponded to business expenses.  The prior failure to 
report thus represents a form of what one might call “self-help tax code simplification.”  
Second, many payments reported by credit card companies may not represent true business 
receipts because of fees, taxes, and merchandise returns.  Some taxpayers may have tried to 
reconcile such discrepancies between amounts on information returns and true receipts by 
reporting fees, taxes, and merchandise returns as “other expenses.”  Third, the tax law may 
impose limitations on business deductions so as to “quarantine” them to particular types of 
income.  Greater income earned in such quarantined activities would automatically (and 
legitimately) increase deductible expenses.  Slemrod et al. offer persuasive evidence that this 
third reason does not explain the increase in expense reporting by the “bunching” taxpayers 
they study.  Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 15 n.32.  However, the extent to which the two 
explanations given in the text underlie the increased expense reporting that they identify is 
unknown.  Because Slemrod et al.’s formal model does not predict the complete offset of 
increased reported receipts by expenses even for strategic taxpayers, these explanations 
remain relevant. 
 153.  Moreover, if the IRS is determined to search in this corner of the haystack, then tax 
cheats may avoid coming into it: the only taxpayers remaining would be the ones who are 
innocent.  This means that the IRS may not be able to commit to auditing this portion of the 
taxpayer population.  
 154.  Id. at 11.  
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reporting will lead to superior audit strategies.  Its potential at generating 
deterrence is similarly unclear. 
The foregoing critique is not meant to imply that the adoption of 
1099-K reporting in the U.S. cannot have beneficial effects for U.S. tax 
administration.  But it does suggest a general conclusion about the limitations 
of the TPIR’s utility, given its limited implementability.  This limitation has 
two aspects.  Suppose that, for the reasons given in Part III.B, TPIR 
requirements may be implementable only for a fraction of market 
transactions.  Suppose that this fraction is β.  Then, first, if for many 
taxpayers, the proportion of transactions they are disposed to report (α) 
without TPIR is a higher proportion (i.e., α >  β), then TPIR will have no 
effect on the compliance behavior of these taxpayers.155  This is so, even if α 
may be significantly less than 1.  Second, when the coverage of TPIR is 
incrementally raised, some taxpayers may be forced to increase reporting 
their taxable receipts, while engaging in related strategic behavior.  It is not 
clear, however, that the IRS should audit such taxpayers, because audit 
selection may be based not on how low α is, but on how likely it is that an 
audit will result in significant adjustments.  This depends not only on α but 
also the size of the taxpayer.156 
IV. FIRMS AS “FISCAL INTERMEDIARIES”: AN INADEQUATE 
CONCEPTION 
Previous scholars postulate that third-party reporting is an essential 
tax collection device that explains modern tax compliance and the capacity 
of developed countries to raise high levels of revenue.157  By contrast, I have 
portrayed third-party reporting as a derivative institution, incapable of 
explaining tax compliance by business firms and frequently substituted by 
other administrative devices in the history of modern taxation.  Similarly, 
whereas many scholars view the scope of TPIR as affording indefinite 
expansion in the future,158 I argue that TPIR is characterized by definite 
limits.  Nonetheless, I believe one fact that previous scholars have identified 
 
 155.  Thus 1099-K reporting may have no effect on the 85% of Schedule C filers for whom 
the K/R ratio is much smaller than 1.  See supra notes 116 and 119 and accompanying text.  
For another example, sole proprietors in the U.S. on average may report only 50% of their 
business income.  See I.R.S., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 96.  
But the coverage of TPIR (β) may well be below this percentage for many taxpayers. 
 156.  Suppose that taxpayers have total receipts of Ri but only report a portion αi.  Tax 
agencies may be mainly interested in those with the largest Ri*(1-αi), not the ones with the 
largest (1-αi).  
 157.  See, e.g., KKS, supra note 3; Kleven, supra note 8; Pomeranz, supra note 9 
(emphasizing the importance of third party reporting in tax collection). 
 158.  See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21; Carrillo et al., supra note 11 (touting the 
boundless benefits of TPIR). 
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may still hold the key to understanding modern tax collection: namely, the 
centrality of business firms to the administration of modern taxes, be it the 
withholding of individual income and payroll, or retail sales taxes, or the 
payment of the corporate income tax, the VAT, and other business taxes.159  
The main question, I would argue, is how to conceptualize the causal 
connection between firms and tax compliance. 
The prevailing view of the role of firms in tax compliance is that 
they act as “fiscal intermediaries”: they collect and remit taxes, as well as 
provide information about other taxpayers, to the government.160  Firms 
generate tax-related information to the government in two ways.  First, by 
providing information directly to the government about the taxable income 
and taxable transactions of employers, investors, and customers, they 
preclude the possibility of not reporting such income or transactions by the 
latter taxpayers.  Second, firms maintain accounting and transaction records, 
which represent information that is not automatically transmitted to the 
government but which the government may use in conducting audits.161  
Through both mechanisms, firms act as depositories of accurate taxpayer 
information which the government can access.  This substantially increases 
the probability of detection of non-compliant behavior, sometimes to close 
to 100%.  It therefore dramatically improves the deterrence effect of 
penalties on non-compliance. 
This conception of firms as passive depositories as well as 
mechanical intermediaries of transactional information is, to my knowledge, 
unusual in legal and social scientific scholarship outside the study of 
taxation.  It is often explicitly tied to the classic deterrence theory of tax 
compliance, pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo.162  Under the Allingham 
and Sandmo model, a taxpayer decides whether to engage in tax evasion by 
weighing the expected benefits of evasion against the expected cost of being 
 
 159.  See supra Part I. 
 160.  See, e.g., Richard Bird, Why Tax Corporations? 10 (Dep’t of Fin.  Can., Technical 
Committee on Business Tax’n Working Papers No. 1996-02, 1996), https://www.ecn.ulaval
.ca/~sgor/cit/bird_FinanceCanadaWP_1996/whytaxcorps.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZG8-3YA
H ] (“The key to effective taxation is information, and the key to information in the modern 
economy is the corporation.”); KKS, supra note 3 (describing firms as fiscal intermediaries); 
Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 39, at 130 (explaining that firms remit the majority of tax 
revenues to the government and are “often required to file information reports that can 
facilitate monitoring of tax liabilities”). 
 161.  See, e.g., Gordon & Li, supra note 45, at 856 n.13 (“[G]overnments . . . rely on 
accounting reports . . . to double-check . . . reports by firms on individual earnings . . . .”); 
KKS, supra note 3, at 220 (“[S]uch [accounting and transaction] records are widely used 
within the firm . . . .”); Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2543 (describing how a firm’s book of 
purchases leads to a third-party paper trail and explaining that although Chilean firms need 
not report that information to the tax authority, it can be accessed through an audit). 
 162.  Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J. PUBLIC ECON. 323 (1972). 
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caught and penalized.163  Taxpayers comply when the expected disutility of 
evasion, which depends on the probability of detection and the magnitude of 
penalties, outweighs its expected utility.164  It has been widely observed that 
by itself, this simple model of the choice about whether to evade taxes seems 
unable to explain the high level of tax compliance observed at least in 
developed countries: the actual levels of penalties, audits, and evasion 
detected during audits in real life are all far too low to lead a rational 
individual considering only these factors to decide against tax evasion.165  
Nonetheless, scholars have suggested that the Allingham and Sandmo model 
can be salvaged if one considers the role of business firms.166  When firms 
both automatically provide information to the government and maintain 
information relevant to audits, then the probability of detection of tax evasion 
(conditional upon an audit being carried out) is increased.167  Moreover, 
when there are fewer firms than individual taxpayers, the audit rate for firms 
is higher than for individuals, which also increases the probability of 
detection.168 
Yet as our earlier discussion anticipated,169 this effort to reconcile 
the Allingham and Sandmo model with the observed high levels of tax 
compliance in the real world merely begs a further question: why do 
decision-makers in firms — owners, managers, and employers — choose not 
to evade tax?  Why do they provide accurate information about other 
 
 163.  Id. at 324-26. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 855 (1998) (“The 
most significant discrepancy that has been documented between the standard economic model 
of compliance and real-world compliance behavior is that the theoretical model greatly over-
predicts noncompliance.”); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and 
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO STATE L.J. 1453, 1457 (2003) (“[I]t is often stated 
in the tax compliance literature that deterrence does not explain voluntary compliance levels 
in the United States or elsewhere.”); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, 
Evasion and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1431 (A.J. 
Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002) (“[B]ased on the degree of risk aversion exhibited in 
other situations people should be evading [taxes] a lot more than they apparently do.”).  For 
information on actual rates of audit, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICES, PUB. 55B, DATA BOOK 
(2015) (Rev. 3-2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2KG-
B5DK] (providing information on rates of audit).  
 166.  See KKS, supra note 3, at 241 (claiming that “third-party information reporting by 
employers can sustain tax enforcement in spite of low fines and low audit rates[,]” and that 
modeling information reporting in the firm context “overcomes the main shortcoming of the 
standard Allingham-Sandmo model of tax evasion”); Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 39, at 
133-34 (advocating “putting firms into optimal tax theory” because “firms . . . give rise to 
relatively easy-to-monitor transactions and can minimize the number of private agents 
authorities must deal with”). 
 167.  Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2540, 2545. 
 168.  Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 35, at 134; Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2542. 
 169.  See supra Part II.A.  
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taxpayers to the government?  In most countries, the population of firms is 
still large relative to the number of tax auditors, which means that the general 
probability of detection of tax evasion by firms would still be very low.  Is 
there any device that renders firms intent on evasion “unable to cheat”?  If 
not, then the Allingham and Sandmo model still cannot be reconciled with 
the levels of (firm) tax compliance observed in the world.  Something else 
must explain observed firm compliance. 
One of the latest attempts to solve this puzzle is found in the KKS 
study mentioned in Part I.170  KKS analyze a firm’s “decision” not to evade 
tax as the feasibility for employers and employees to maintain an equilibrium 
of collusion: if everyone in the firm can agree to and honor a bargain to cheat 
on the taxes that the firm is required to remit, and to divide up the firms’ 
consequent cash savings, then the firm will evade taxes.171  They argue that 
such equilibrium would be difficult to maintain under two types of 
circumstances.  First, individual disgruntled (or morally conscientious) 
employees create a small probability that the collusion would be reported 
and detected, and such probabilities would become sufficiently large when 
the firm is sufficiently large.172  Second, the government can offer monetary 
awards for whistleblowing to employees who otherwise would have been 
willing to collude in the firm’s tax evasion.173  KKS in effect offer an analog 
of the Allingham and Sandmo model for firms: the probability of detection 
of evasive behavior crucially depends not on audits conducted by the 
government, but on disgruntled employees or whistleblowers. 
Unfortunately, this account of firms’ tax compliance decisions is just 
as problematic as the traditional account of individual tax compliance 
decisions.  To begin, although whistleblower programs operated by tax and 
other regulatory agencies have attracted attention in recent years, their role 
in the history of tax and other areas of regulatory enforcement has been 
minimal.174  Even today, whistleblower programs are viewed as 
 
 170.  KKS, supra note 3.  Another strand of the recent literature claims that firms do not 
cheat because they are subject to information reporting by other firms, for example through 
mechanisms under the VAT.  See Carrillo et al., supra note 11, at 14; Pomeranz, supra note 
9, at 2541 (arguing that firms report honestly due to information reporting requirements).  I 
have argued elsewhere that this strand of analysis involves mischaracterizations of and 
implausible claims about the VAT.  Wei Cui, Information Reporting and State Capacity, 
paper presented at Part III of the 109th Annual Conference of the National Tax Association 
(Nov. 10, 2016). 
 171.  KKS, supra note 3, at 220. 
 172.  Id.  KKS does not provide any simulation to specify how many employees a firm 
needs to have for evasion to be infeasible. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Whistle-Blowing Insiders: ‘Game Changer’ for the 
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/dealbo
ok/whistle-blowing-insiders-game-changer-for-the-sec.html [https://perma.cc/J476-QED9] 
(discussing a whistleblower program that was only recently adopted by the U.S. Securities 
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complements to regulatory agencies’ audit operations, allowing the 
government to discover violations that would otherwise be difficult to 
uncover,175 rather than as a mechanism imposing more systematic constraints 
on taxpayers and other regulated subjects than audits themselves.  It is simply 
implausible to claim that whistleblower programs undergird the 
transformation of public finance in the twentieth century witnessed in most 
advanced economies.176  Moreover, while it is commonly observed that 
larger firms tend to be more compliant with tax law and other legal 
requirements, firm size in itself does not preclude fraudulent activity: recent 
reports of large-scale frauds at Volkswagen and Wells Fargo offer vivid 
reminders of this fact.177 
In the (vast) legal and social scientific literature on tax 
compliance,178 the inadequacy of the Allingham and Sandmo model has led 
to a variety of theories about why individuals may be motivated to follow 
the tax law.179  It is not the intention of this Article to review or even 
summarize this variety of theories.180  I will instead note two features of the 
 
and Exchange Commission); Laura Saunders, How to Turn In Your Neighbor to the IRS, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119033527045
76540840395329676 [https://perma.cc/85SR-HH5F] (quoting tax historian Joseph Thorndike 
as reporting that payments to whistleblowers in the history of U.S. taxation “tended to be 
small and rare because IRS officials were uncomfortable with ‘bounty hunting’”); Jordan A. 
Thomas, Policing the Banks Is an Inside Job, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2016/10/01/opinion/policing-the-banks-is-an-inside-job.html 
[https://perma.cc/8W79-LAAW] (advocating the adoption of a whistleblower program by 
banking regulators). 
 175.  See Henning, supra note 174 (noting, for example, that rewards for whistleblowers 
are increased in areas of agency priority).  
 176.  See supra Part I, Figure 2.  
 177.  Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 
12, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fine-against-wells-
fargo-points-to-the-failure-of-regulation [https://perma.cc/R2VT-PEM2]; Russell Hotten, 
Volkswagen: The scandal explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/2RAG-TDE4]. 
 178.  See Slemrod, supra note 11 for a review of recent scholarship.  For earlier reviews, 
see Andreoni et al., supra note 165; Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the 
Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 
29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 102 (2007) (exploring tax compliance in terms of a psychological tax 
contract between citizens and the government); Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 165. 
 179.  The inadequacy of the deterrence theory of compliance in other areas of publicly-
enforced law has led to similar explorations in alternative theories.  See, e.g., Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate 
Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 60 (2003) (“In the academic literature 
and policy debates, an alternative ‘cooperation model’ has been proposed, in large part 
as a reaction to the adversarial enforcement methods suggested by 
the deterrence model.”). 
 180.  A relatively recent summary and set of references can be found in Alex Raskolnikov, 
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
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literature. First, theories that are presented as major alternatives to the 
Allingham and Sandmo model tend to postulate psychological features of 
individuals that are not captured by that model.181  However, to my 
knowledge, none has attempted to “put firms into [the theory]” in the way 
that scholars (such as KKS) aiming to salvage or expand the Allingham and 
Sandmo model have done.  In other words, only scholars interested in 
reformulating the Allingham and Sandmo model have given significance to 
the regular empirical association between the presence of business firms and 
higher levels of tax compliance.  Yet as Part I discussed, such empirical 
regularity seems unmistakable and forms part of the conventional wisdom of 
what makes tax administration effective.  Of course, conventional wisdoms 
may be mistaken (as I have argued is the case for the belief about the 
importance of TPIR), but they may also be robust and offer important 
theoretical insights. 
Second, many scholars have formulated theories and empirically 
tested hypotheses about tax compliance as though tax compliance is a self-
contained social problem.182  Although some legal scholars have argued that 
people comply with the tax law simply because there is a social norm of 
complying with the law, this approach is not generally followed.183  Instead, 
scholars tend to study individual preferences and attitudes specifically 
towards tax compliance, as if paying tax has become a deep-rooted part of 
our psyche.184  Yet modern taxation directly affecting the obligations of mass 
 
689, 696-701 (2009).  Another recent literature review can be found in Erzo F.P. Luttmer & 
Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP.. 149 (2014). 
 181.  See, e.g., FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF 
EVASION 102–03 (1990) (finding that taxpayers’ perceptions of other taxpayers in the same 
social grouping affect taxpaying attitudes and behaviors); Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. 
Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence 
Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 847 (1990) (showing that the effect of the feeling of guilt 
or shame on tax cheating deterrence is greater than the effect of legal sanctions); Harold G. 
Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison 
with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 223 (1982) (showing that feelings of 
guilt have a greater effect on tax evasion deterrence than the threat of legal sanctions). 
 182.  See, e.g, ERICH KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR (2007); Erik 
Hoelzl et al., Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The “slippery slope” framework, 29 
J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 210 (2008); Erich Kirchler, The art of dodging, FINANCIAL WORLD (June-
July 2015), at 43 (putting forth theories that treat tax compliance as a contained social 
problem).  
 183.  See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1781 (2000) (discussing tax compliance through the lens of the signaling model and 
social norms). 
 184.  See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 165; Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 181; 
Grasmick & Scott, supra note 181; James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and 
Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224 (2006) (discussing 
tax compliance in terms of a country’s “tax morale”); Michael R. Welch et al., “But 
Everybody Does It . . .”: The Effects of Perceptions, Moral Pressures, and Informal Sanctions 
CUI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:26 PM 
2017] INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN TAX COLLECTION 133 
 
populations of individuals has been practiced in most countries for barely a 
century.185 
These features of the existing literature imply that existing theories 
of tax compliance may have neglected two institutional foundations of 
modern tax collection.  The first is the business firm, which performs most 
of the compliance obligations under all modern taxes.186  Ironically, those 
scholars who have stressed the business firm’s significance in tax 
compliance have at the same time conceived of it in such as a way (i.e., as a 
mechanical information depository and transmission device) as to give it 
very limited explanatory power.187  The second is the modern legal system, 
as embodied by institutions that play legislative, regulatory, enforcement, 
and adjudicatory functions, and as animated by the social norm of 
compliance with the law.  The key to understanding tax compliance may 
precisely lie in understanding how individual behavior is mediated by these 
two types of institutions.  I now describe how such an explanation would 
work. 
V. FIRMS AS SITES OF SOCIAL COOPERATION ORDERED BY LAW 
Consider the postulate that in modern (i.e., industrial and post-
industrial) economies, most business firms operate, for the most part, in 
compliance with the law.  If this is true, then an important social scientific 
question will be why it is true — what has brought about this state of affairs.  
But let me clarify first what the postulate means and what follows from it, if 
it is true. 
The claim that most modern business firms mostly comply with the 
law is meant to convey the following two ideas.  First, most firms operate in 
ways that are constrained by a wide range of legal rules and norms.  That is, 
a firm makes its decisions while heeding most of the requirements of contract 
law, tort law, property (including intellectual property) law, and other 
relevant bodies of private law.  It also attends to the relevant requirements of 
various bodies of regulatory law, such as those regarding public and 
workplace safety, labor and employment, environmental protection, 
financial prudence and disclosure, and so on.  This does not mean that the 
firm is necessarily perfectly compliant with the law.  Far from it.  
Volkswagen may systematically install illegal “defeat devices” in its diesel 
engines to dodge the Environmental Protection Agency’s emission tests.188  
 
on Tax Cheating, 25 SOC. SPECTRUM 21, 29 (2005) (“[S]tudies have examined the effects of 
moral obligation on taxpayer compliance.”). 
 185.  KKS, supra note 3, at 225 (Figure 2). 
 186.  See supra Parts I-II. 
 187.  Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 39. 
 188.  Hotten, supra note 177. 
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But this could happen while the company at the same time conscientiously 
follows all kinds of other legal requirements imposed by Germany and the 
United States.  Wells Fargo may put intense pressure on retail branch 
employees to meet sales targets, knowing that this had led to and would 
continue to lead to the creation of fake customer accounts, but the bank 
meanwhile could very well be highly compliant in its tax and securities 
filings.189  In other words, for many firms that purposely engage in one type 
of illegal behavior or another, they nonetheless are acting in compliance with 
a wide range of other applicable laws.  They do not cheat “wherever they 
can,” in the sense of exploiting every opportunity to earn an expected profit 
by violating the law. 
Second, while some business firms may be better behaved than 
Volkswagen and Wells Fargo, others are of course more ill-behaved.  Some 
firms act in dodgy ways in respect of many legal requirements.  But it may 
be plausible to classify these firms into several categories.  To begin, there 
are the very small firms — indeed in economists’ use of the term, a “firm” 
could be a sole business proprietor.  A small firm’s behavior would not be 
distinguishable from the behavior of its few individual owners or employees, 
and there is little intra-firm organization or coordination.  Alternatively, a 
frequently law-dodging firm could be large, but we expect it to be one that 
is otherwise uncompetitive in the market it operates: it needs to cheat 
wherever possible just to survive.190  Finally, there are of course firms that 
are formed deliberately to commit fraud or other crimes.  However, putting 
this last type of firm aside, and even considering small firms and firms under 
intense competitive pressure and the fact that these firms are more likely to 
act in disregard of the law than others, the following seems to be true: few 
firms are organized with the expectation that it would deliberately profit 
from the violation of all laws that are profitable to violate, and few firms 
grow and remain competitive by profiting from illegal activities.  This is 
what I mean by the claim that most modern business firms mostly comply 
with the law. 
Having explained the meaning of the claim, I now explain one 
crucial consequence of it.  The claim implies that most modern business 
firms would not make decisions about tax compliance in the way that KKS’ 
model suggests: they do not decide to comply with the tax law only when an 
internal collusive bargain about how to divide the spoils of tax evasion 
cannot be sustained.  Instead, complying with the tax law, like complying 
 
 189.  Davidson, supra note 177. 
 190.  See Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence 
from Chinese Industrial Firms, 119 ECON. J. (LONDON) 764 (2009) (arguing that market 
competition increases incentives for Chinese firms to engage in tax avoidance activities); 
Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior? 94 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (2004) 
(illustrating how unethical conduct can be a consequence of market competition). 
CUI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:26 PM 
2017] INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN TAX COLLECTION 135 
 
with other bodies of laws, is the default option.  If a firm is generally 
compliant with the law, then compliance with the tax law should simply be 
expected.  Specific firms may be engaged in non-compliance with the tax 
law at specific times, but such behavior is to be explained in the same way 
as one would want to explain why Volkswagen decided to install its “defeat 
devices,” and why Wells Fargo pushed its employees towards fraudulent 
practices.  In other words, when the baseline expectation is compliance, 
specific instances of non-compliance are what require explanation, not the 
multitude of instances of compliance. 
Here, it should be noted that KKS’ model has a common structure 
with the Allingham and Sandmo model of individual tax compliance: the 
taxpayer, whether a firm or an individual, always confronts a meaningful 
choice between complying and not complying with tax law, and it would 
choose to comply only when the expected penalty for non-compliance is 
large enough.191  Moreover, this choice is conceived in a way that could 
characterize choices about whether to comply with any other body of law: as 
long as the expected rewards of non-compliance outweigh the expected 
punishment of non-compliance, non-compliance should be observed.  The 
empirical postulate above about modern business firms’ general tendency 
towards law compliance precisely contradicts the premise of these 
theoretical models.192  It claims instead that modern business firms are 
generally law-abiding, or at least enough of them are for tax and other 
regulatory systems generally to function. 
However, making this postulate is not the end, but only the 
beginning, of social scientific inquiries.  The important social scientific 
 
 191.  KKS, supra note 3, at 229 (Proposition 2). 
 192.  There is an obvious analogue of this objection to the KKS model for the Allingham 
and Sandmo model.  The latter model is famously inspired by Gary Becker’s economic model 
of crime: when Allingham and Sandmo conceptualize an individual taxpayer’s compliance 
decision, they portray the person in a way similar to a criminal weighing the costs and benefits 
of a crime.  Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169 (1968).  However, Becker did not set out to explain why ordinary people do not commit 
crime by his economic model: his economic theory of deterrence is intended only to apply to 
criminals.  Allingham & Sandmo, on the other hand, conflate the ordinary taxpayer deciding 
what to enter on his tax return and a criminally-minded person ready to cheat on his taxes 
where possible.  Allingham and Sandmo, supra note 162, at 323 (citing studies of the 
economics of criminal activity as relevant to “the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether 
and to what extent to avoid taxes by deliberate underreporting[,]” implying the irrelevance of 
the distinction between a typical taxpayer and a criminal).  That is to say, they elide the 
distinction between the ordinary person and the criminal in depicting the rational choice about 
tax compliance.  Id.  Whether this is a plausible depiction of the average taxpayer’s 
psychology is controversial.  Those who favor the Allingham and Sandmo model presumably 
find the characterization more (or at least no less) plausible than representations of the average 
taxpayer as pro-social, conscientiously law-abiding, and simply oblivious to the potential 
rewards of cheating.  The argument I make in this Part does not require one to take a position 
directly on this controversy. 
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question is not why, given the default choice of cheating, most (large) firms 
don’t cheat on their taxes.  It is rather why these firms may not even consider 
cheating on their taxes — why cheating is not their default choice.  A number 
of theoretical and historical considerations suggest that there may be genuine 
answers to this question, and that it does not just offer a rhetorical 
reformulation of the seemingly intractable controversy about what produces 
compliance on the part of individual taxpayers. 
The first theoretical consideration is that firms generally form in 
order to earn some economic rent.193  If there is no economic rent to be made, 
one can simply purchase and sell in the market and there is no need to form 
a firm.194  However, if firms are generally formed with the purpose of earning 
rent given market prices, then there is no need for firms already formed to 
further exploit profits from violations of the law.  It is true that some illegal 
activities can be conducted only through firms (e.g., certain Ponzi schemes, 
VAT carousal fraud, etc.).195  But it is also the case that most illegal activities 
can be pursued without forming firms.  Therefore, if a firm is formed not in 
order to profit from illegal activities, but with the purpose of earning rents 
from other identified opportunities, then it would not be surprising if the firm 
does not maximally exploit opportunities arising from illegal behavior; that 
is simply not its purpose. 
 
 193.  See generally G.C. Archibald, Theory of the firm, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Lawrence Blume & Steven Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2005) (reviewing 
theories of the firm and the role of quasi-rent in such theories); OLIVER. E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996) (illustrating that firms are distinguished by firm-
specific assets that generate quasi-rent); Oliver D. Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the 
Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989) (providing an overview of how 
economists think about firms); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the 
Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988) (proposing that a firm can be thought of as arising out 
of the incompleteness of contracts); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate 
Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L. J. 1277 (1995) (asserting that corporate 
financial claims can reveal the net value of a firm in alternative uses); Benjamin Klein et al., 
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. 
LAW ECON. 297 (1978) (considering the economic costs of forming a firm); Joseph T. 
Mahoney & Lihong Qian, Market Frictions as Building Blocks of An Organizational 
Economics Approach to Strategic Management, 34 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1019 (2013) (using a 
theory of rent-generating market frictions to explain the existence of the firm); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Examining economic organization through the lens of contract, 12 IND. CORP. 
CHANGE 917 (2003) (examining firms from the perspective of transaction cost economics). 
 194.  Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (explaining that 
firms form to reduce transaction cost and earn profit that could not be earned through market 
transactions). 
 195.  See, e.g., GIANLUCA FIORENTINI & SAM PELTZMAN (EDS.), THE ECONOMICS OF 
ORGANIZED CRIME (1995) Vimal Kumar & Stergios Skaperdas, On the Economics of 
Organized Crime (University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, Working 
Papers No. 70815, 2008), http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2007-
08/skaperdas-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRX8-XR5Z] (giving background about the structure 
of organized crime organizations);.  
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A second consideration, which is both theoretical and historical in 
nature, is that much of the modern legal system is concerned with how to 
divide up the rent earned by firms among the contributors to the firm — 
employees, lenders, equity investors, suppliers and customers.196  This is 
what corporate and other organizational law is about.197  It also forms an 
important part of the substance of employment, labor and securities law.  
That is to say, social cooperation that is centered on a firm inherently 
presupposes ways of dividing up the surplus from cooperation, and the legal 
system appears to have been deeply involved in facilitating this division and 
thus enabling firm-centered cooperation.  Therefore, firm-centered social 
cooperation is a paradigmatic form of “legal order” — social cooperation 
mediated by legal norms.198 
A recent study by Suresh Naidu and Noam Yuchtman of nineteenth 
century labor market institutions in the United States vividly illustrates this 
consideration.199  Naidu and Yuchtman examine a part of U.S. history (1850 
until the early 1920s) when labor markets were still largely unregulated.200  
They first show that firm-specific rents were frequently observed in urban 
American labor markets:  when firms experienced positive output price 
shocks, their employees earned wage premia, relative to other employees 
with very similar skills in the same urban labor market.201  They then argue 
that the existence of rents in the labor contract created space for bargaining 
and conflict between employees and employers:  strikes became sharply 
more frequent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often 
involved physical coercion against replacement workers, and were correlated 
with higher workers’ wages.202  On their side, employers occasionally called 
in the police and military to break strikes, but more frequently and equally 
effectively sought judicial injunctions to end strikes.203  In other words, even 
before the advent of labor and employment regulations, both the coercive 
 
 196.  See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984) 
(modelling how managers facilitate cooperation game among capitalists and workers to 
achieve institutional rent). 
 197.  Marco Becht et al., Corporate Law and Governance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 829-943 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds. 2007). 
 198.  For the concept of a legal order as opposed to social cooperation governed by other 
types of social norms, see Gillian Hadfield & Barry Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule 
of Law, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 21 (2014). 
 199.  Suresh Naidu & Noam Yuchtman, Labor Market Institutions in the Gilded Age of 
American History (NBER Working Paper No. 22117, 2016).  
 200.  Some European countries had already adopted labor regulations at the time.  See, 
e.g., William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America: 
A Study of the Constitutive Power of Law, 16 L. &  SOC. INQUIRY 1, 22-25 (1991) (discussing 
the history and evolution of English labor law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
 201.  Naidu & Yuchtman, supra note 199, at 9-11. 
 202.  Id. at 11-12. 
 203.  Id. at 17-20. 
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apparatus of the state and judicial institutions were called upon to resolve 
intra-firm conflicts.  Subsequent labor and wage regulations that began to be 
adopted at the state level in the early twentieth century and at the federal 
level as a result of the New Deal are clearly more permanent legal institutions 
that allowed firm-centered social cooperation to continue.204 
In other words, reliance on the legal system — and in particular on 
the regulatory apparatus of the state — may be essential to the growth of the 
modern business firm as we know it.  Compliance with legal rules and norms, 
and monitoring the compliance of other parties, are intrinsic aspects of the 
modern business firm as an institution.  From this perspective, the basic 
reason that large firms are more likely to be compliant is not that the 
probability of motivated whistleblowers is higher in them (or that they have 
greater external visibility).  The potentially more important reason is that the 
firms grew larger because they were profitable, and the participants in them 
are more interested in the orderly division of profits than the disorder implied 
by cheating (on taxes and other regulatory matters).  While the keeping of 
business records and proper accounting practices form a part of this 
cooperative process, their main benefit for tax compliance may arise not 
from facilitating effective audits by the government, but from the fact that 
they allow participants in a firm to monitor one another in assessing whether 
the expectation of fair divisions of profits is fulfilled. 
This conjecture seems consistent with the history of modern taxation 
in different industrial economies.  In the United States, for example, the 
adoption of the “mass income tax” began in 1939 and the withholding of 
income tax on wage payments — the administrative institution that scholars 
previously focused on — began in 1943.205  Both were pre-dated by the 
adoption of withholding of Social Security taxes in 1935.206  To track the 
roots of income tax compliance in the United States, therefore, one needs to 
explain why business firms complied with the Social Security excise on 
employers and with the even earlier legal requirements (enacted in 1909) to 
pay corporate income taxes.207  Previous tax legal scholarship has suggested 
that the corporate income tax was conceived from the beginning as at least 
in part a device for regulating large U.S. corporations, and this regulatory 
impulse was also manifest in corporate and antitrust law developments at the 
same time.208  But just as relevantly, corporations and employers in general 
 
 204.  Id. at 20. 
 205.  Desai, supra note 16, at 865, 896.  Notably, the previous version of wage 
withholding, introduced in 1860, involved the withholding only by the federal government as 
employer, not by business firms.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 889-96. 
 207.  Id. at 882. 
 208.  See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004) (describing the origins of the corporate income 
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had already been subject to other forms of regulation to facilitate the 
formation of American financial and labor markets.209  By the time the 
corporate income tax was put in place, whether to comply with the law was 
presumably neither a new question nor one that businesses could easily give 
a negative answer to if they were to continue to operate at all 
In summary, it seems that as a matter of actual history, two 
interrelated institutions might have represented the central components of 
the foundation of modern tax collection.  The first is the business firm.  The 
second is the set of legal rules and norms that developed from the eighteenth 
to the twentieth century that accompanied the growth of the corporate form: 
organizational law, antitrust and securities regulation, and labor and 
employment law, in addition to the ever-present bodies of contract, property, 
tort, and other private law.  Because the operation of most business firms 
was inseparable from the implementation and following of legal orders, the 
decision to comply with the tax law was a natural one for firms to make.  
Upon these foundations, both business taxes and taxes imposed on 
individuals but remitted by businesses evolved, with withholding, third-party 
reporting, other administrative devices, and legal doctrines that guide the use 
of such devices all emerging simultaneously.  Self-reporting, audits, and 
other methods of enforcing the tax law were always important to tax 
collection, just as they were important in securing compliance with other 
types of law applicable to firms.  But most firms in most circumstances may 
also have displayed a substantial degree of voluntary compliance, insofar as 
the laws they followed enabled social cooperation in the context of the firm 
in the first place 
Three features distinguish the foregoing account of modern tax 
compliance from previous accounts.  First, the explanation is institutional:  
it refers to specific institutions, social practices, and legal norms.  By 
contrast, much of the social scientific literature on tax compliance, like the 
Allingham and Sandmo model, is psychological and predicts social behavior 
from assumptions about individual psychology (the only institutions 
assumed are tax return filing, auditing and the imposition of penalties).  The 
benefit of the institutional approach is that it allows us to focus on explaining 
why rational, self-interested individuals may engage in cooperation in 
 
tax, particularly the regulatory rationale behind its conception); Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory 
as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449 (2001) 
(dating the “dual system of business taxation in which corporations and partnerships receive 
disparate treatment” back over a century). 
 209.  Mark Aldrich, History of Workplace Safety in the United States, in EH.NET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS HISTORY (Robert Whaples ed., 2001), 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-workplace-safety-in-the-united-states-1880-1970/ 
[https://perma.cc/CT4Q-G7EM].  
CUI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:26 PM 
140 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.1 
 
specific contexts, instead of explaining why they are generally willing to 
cooperate. 
Second, while other scholars have also emphasized the importance 
of the firm as a crucial institutional component of modern tax compliance, 
under the account given here, there is much more going on in firms that is 
potentially of interest to tax auditors than just the keeping of business records 
and accounting books.  Instead, firms are places where members of society 
actively cooperate under regimes of law.  Instead of gaming the system 
where they can, individuals pursue profit and bargain for rent within the 
confines of law.  This approach has strong support from economic theories 
of the firm,210 and allows the psychological theories of compliance to be 
enriched by the theoretic and empirical literature in organizational 
economics. 
Third, the account captures the intuition of many that there is nothing 
special about tax compliance per se, vis-à-vis compliance with other aspects 
of the law; it should be explainable by the same motivations.  However, 
instead of postulating general pro-social, norms-respecting motivations for 
individual taxpayers, the account suggests that they will be motivated to act 
this way, in respect to many types of law, in the context of the firm.  It is 
worth noting here that using TPIR to explain modern tax compliance would 
provide one with no purchase in explaining most other types of compliance 
with the law.  As suggested above, the conception of business firms as 
passive and mechanical depositories and transmission devices for taxpayer 
information has no analogue in other literature.211  Seeing business firms as 
institutions within which individuals can cooperate in an indefinite range of 
ways while being regulated by an indefinite range of legal norms, by 
contrast, not only constitutes a generalizable theory of tax compliance but 
also gives such theory greater plausibility. 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Understanding the institutional foundations of modern taxation has 
deep policy implications both for developing countries aiming to enhance 
their state capacity212 and for developed countries like the United States 
aiming to improve tax compliance.213  This Part offers a preliminary 
discussion of how the perspective developed in the preceding Parts suggests 
 
 210.  See supra notes 193-97. 
 211.  See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 179 (attempting to draw analogies between tax 
compliance and compliance with environmental regulations, in which third-party information 
reporting plays no role).   
 212.  See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.  
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policy directions different from what scholarship focused on TPIR would 
recommend. 
A. Implications for Developing Countries 
There is no doubt that in any country, when the level of tax 
compliance is low, tax collectors thirst for taxpayer information.  It is thus 
hard to overstate the appeal to developing countries of the notion that high-
tax, advanced economies have designed institutions for transmitting and 
making use of massive amounts of taxpayer information.  If such information 
gathering devices can be adopted, they would be effective substitutes for 
voluntary compliance.  Taxpayers would have no choice but to obey the 
law.214  A technological approach to tax administration would then help many 
poor countries overcome the weaknesses of their institutions. 
As much as recent scholarship on TPIR has encouraged this 
notion,215 this Article has argued that it is fundamentally untenable.  
Promoting the forms of TPIR that are commonly adopted in developed 
economies is unlikely to dramatically enhance tax administration capacity in 
developing countries for the following reasons.  First, the standard forms of 
TPIR adopted by developed countries apply to the collection of the personal 
income tax on wage and passive financial income.216  But all available 
evidence suggests that developing countries already deploy similar 
administrative devices — especially withholding — for such tax bases.  For 
example, Leslie Robinson and Joel Slemrod examined whether developing 
countries use information reporting or withholding less than developed 
countries by systematically coding comparative information about tax 
administration published by the OECD.217  They analyzed, for each of 47 
countries: (1) the total number of income categories for which tax is withheld 
and remitted by the payer; (2) the total number of categories of income that 
are subject to information reporting; and (3) the extent to which taxpayer 
identification numbers (TINs) are used as measured by the total number of 
payment types that use TINs.218  It turns out that all of these variables are 
negatively correlated with a country’s GDP per capita: the poorer countries 
use withholding, information reporting, and identity-matching more than the 
 
 214.  Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 689-691.  
 215.  See supra notes 9-14, 34-41 and accompanying text.  
 216.  See supra Part I. 
 217.  Leslie Robinson & Joel Slemrod, Understanding Multidimensional Tax Systems, 19 
INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 237 (2012).  The comparative information covers 30 OECD and 17 non-
OECD countries for the year 2005.  The 17 non-OECD countries include, among others, 
Brazil, India, China, Malaysia, Russia, and South Africa. 
 218.  Robinson & Slemrod, supra note 217, at 243. 
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wealthier countries.219  They thus observe: “In higher-income countries, the 
revenue body uses withholding and reporting on fewer types of income.”220  
Similar studies done by the IMF also suggest that many developing countries 
heavily rely on withholding.221 
It is thus very unlikely that developing countries are not attuned to 
the wide use of withholding and TPIR for the personal income tax in 
developed countries.  Instead, the problem is much more likely that they have 
far smaller tax bases comprising wage and passive financial income: their 
formal employment sectors and financial institutions are more under-
developed.222  The important question is then whether TPIR has proven to be 
useful in the experience of developed countries, outside the context of these 
particular components of the personal income tax.  As Parts I-III have shown, 
the answer is no.  TPIR has had only limited application in the individual 
business income context,223 and its utility for increasing compliance in such 
a context is still open to debate.224  Moreover, such limitation may have 
universal explanations (e.g., in terms of when market participants keep 
mutual identities) invariant to developmental contexts.225  In addition, 
developed countries rarely use TPIR in connection with other important 
modern taxes.226  It would clearly be a mistake to infer – from the fact that 
 
 219.  Id. at 251.  Robinson and Slemrod also use factor analysis to construct a single 
variable that summarizes tax administration features of a country, which they label “Dispersed 
Responsibility” and which they view as capturing “the extent to which the tax collection 
system disperses responsibility and the direct compliance burden away from the tax authority 
to the taxpayer and third parties such as employer withholders.”  The same negative 
correlation with GDP per capita obtains for this variable.  Id. at 249. 
 220.  Id. at 251.  Robinson and Slemrod only analyze income tax administration.  The wide 
adoption of the VAT, and the dominance of VAT revenue over not only personal but also 
corporate income tax revenue in many developing countries, would further strengthen the 
quoted observation.  See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 2. 
 221.  See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries 31 
(prepared by Fiscal Affairs Dept.) (Mar. 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011
/030811.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG97-RSG3] (finding receipts from the personal income tax 
in developing countries come almost entirely from wage withholding on large enterprises and 
public sector employees); see also id. at 41 (noting advance collection on imports is common 
in Africa).   
 222.  See Gordon & Li, supra note 45 (hypothesizing that low levels of financial 
development substantially determine the tax structures of developing countries); Jensen, 
supra note 44 (showing limited size of formal employment sectors in developing countries).  
See also discussion supra Part II.D.   
 223.  See supra Part III.A-B.  
 224.  See supra Part III.C. 
 225.  See supra Part III.B.  See also Carrillo et al., supra note 11 (arguing that in 
developing countries, TPIR may be ineffective due to its incompleteness and because 
taxpayers can always evade on the margins where government verification is difficult; 
Carrillo et al. thereby imply that this is not the case in developed countries, which is incorrect). 
 226.  See supra Part I. 
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wage and personal financial income constitute larger tax bases in developed 
countries – that developed countries use TPIR in a wider variety of ways 
than (or in substantively different ways from) developing countries.227 
As argued earlier, developed countries to a very large extent rely on 
businesses to withhold, remit, and pay most taxes.228  Voluntary business 
compliance lies at the foundation of TPIR, not the other way around.229  
When businesses comply with the tax law, the government can afford to be 
somewhat indifferent about whether information on individual taxpayers is 
collected or analyzed.  Tax administrators from developing countries are in 
fact likely to be quite familiar with this logic.  Developing countries 
generally rely far less on the personal income tax and social security 
contributions for revenue than developed countries; the corporate income 
tax, VAT, turnover taxes, and other business taxes collectively represent a 
much greater portion of the tax take.230  One could thus say that business 
firms are the main source of revenue for developing countries.  What, then, 
differentiates between tax administrations in poorer and in richer countries 
— what, from the perspective of law enforcement and compliance, explains 
the striking difference among them captured by political economists?231 
This Article has suggested the following answer.  The growth of 
business firms in developed countries has been closely intertwined with the 
regulatory state, in that the latter has played a crucial role in facilitating the 
division of economic profit within business firms.  Within the institution of 
the modern firm, rational, self-interested individuals are able to engage 
profitably in a whole range of economic cooperation, in key part because 
they can rely on regulatory mechanisms to ensure that the benefits of 
cooperation are divided in ways that are bargained for.  For this reason, 
participants in the firm are often willing to commit resources to compliance 
with regulations and the law in general.  This dynamic has evolved to a point 
that firms generally do not consider non-compliance with tax law as their 
default option; after all, the tax law is generally enacted and enforced by the 
same governments that have enacted and enforced the other legal rules that 
are crucial to the cohesion of firms.  What distinguishes richer and poor 
 
 227.  Developing countries may make less use of TPIR, as opposed to withholding, insofar 
as their governments are less likely to make non-observable characteristics of taxpayers 
determinative of tax liabilities.  See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
 228.  See supra Part I.  
 229.  See supra Part II.B.  
 230.  Richard Bird & Eric Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005); Gordon & Li, 
supra note 45.   
 231.  See KKS, supra note 3 (modeling how TPIR by employers may sustain tax 
enforcement, despite low fines and audit rates, as economic development affects the structure 
of firms to promote verifiable book evidence and large numbers of employees).  See also 
supra Figure 1. 
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countries, therefore, is that in the former there are more firms that operate in 
this mode, both because of the greater development of markets and because 
of the deeper involvement of governments in sustaining these markets. 
Such an analysis clearly implies that the effectiveness of tax 
administration depends on exogenous factors — factors that fall outside tax 
administrators’ control.  Improving tax administration must of necessity be 
viewed in a holistic manner.  While information gathering and enforcement 
aimed at producing deterrence are always important, tax collection will also 
inevitably be a matter of relying on, contributing to, and, importantly, not 
disrupting social cooperation centered on business firms that are ordered by 
legal and regulatory systems.  Deterrence cannot substitute for voluntary 
compliance.  Therefore, one must be cautious about adopting any instrument 
of deterrence if it would undermine voluntary compliance.232  This provides 
new support to the idea that rule of law norms are important to tax 
administration.233 
B. Implications for the U.S. and Other Developed Countries 
Third-party information reporting, only to a slightly lesser extent 
than withholding, has become a deeply entrenched feature of personal 
income tax administration in the United States and other advanced 
economies.234  The expansion of TPIR in the U.S. to include broker reporting 
of the tax basis of securities and credit card and electronic settlements of 
merchants,235 although still largely unrivaled by other countries, is not 
altogether surprising.  Not only do the costs of the new reporting 
requirements now seem acceptable and not overly onerous, the issuance of 
1099-Ks and similar forms will likely be embraced by an ever-growing 
population of taxpayers, as the forms help taxpayers to keep clear records 
and thereby reduce compliance costs.236 
 
 232.  Another way of putting this is that the chief lesson for tax administrators from the 
investigation of the institutional foundations of modern taxation is not so much about what to 
do as it is about what not to do. 
 233.  See THE DELICATE BALANCE: TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW (Chris Evans, 
Judith Freedman, et al. eds., 2011) (exploring the tension between the necessary discretionary 
power of tax administration authorities and the rights of taxpayers to have that power 
governed by the rule of law); Wei Cui, Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance: 
A Transactional Cost Perspective, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 186 (2015) (providing an account of 
how tax collection may proceed in the absence of voluntary compliance and the distortions to 
tax policy this generates).   
 234.  See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 65 (providing a comparative 
review of the practice of final withholding on wage income and financial income). 
 235.  See supra notes 18-20.  
 236.  See Oei & Ring, supra note 18 (making recommendations for more effective tax 
administration and compliance incentives for gig economy workers based on studying the tax 
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None of the arguments in this Article are meant to suggest that the 
U.S. should roll back any specific type of TPIR that it currently adopts, or to 
deny that TPIR may have assorted benefits for taxpayers.  Nor do I advocate 
against any specific way of expanding the scope of TPIR.  If the arguments 
in Part III.B are correct, there are likely to be natural limits of TPIR, 
expansion beyond which may generate substantial jumps in compliance 
costs.  But the magnitude of such costs will clearly depend on the 
technologies available.  If, for example, few American consumers and 
businesses use cash or even credit cards in the future, but instead rely on 
newer technologies (such as Blockchain) to execute payments, it may be that 
even instantaneous transactions will begin to leave digital trails that would 
identify the transacting parties and the amount and nature of transactions.  
Should the IRS want to collect such information to limit under-reporting of 
business income by self-employed individuals, it would probably be able to 
do so more easily (and with less political resistance) than today. 
But such speculations about how future technology might reduce tax 
evasion are misguided, for at least two (related) reasons.  First, it is highly 
likely that new technologies will transform markets and economies, leading 
to substantial changes in the tax policy instruments that societies adopt.  In 
other words, the main tax bases in future economies will likely be different 
from the tax bases today.237  To imagine how future technology might solve 
tax administration problems that exist only relative to the tax bases we have 
today is an odd form of futuristic exercise.  Second, unless technology by 
itself could guarantee large-scale social cooperation, it seems implausible to 
imagine that in future societies there will not be criminals, free-riders, and 
norm violators.  Presumably, technologies are developed to enable most 
cooperative humans to reap greater cooperative gains.  They are not designed 
to make non-cooperation impossible.  Therefore, criminal and free-riders 
will find new ways to cheat, and it will be completely irrelevant that they 
cannot cheat by exactly the same means as they do today. 
Overall, that is, tax administration in the future (for those who care 
to think about it) will depend on a wide range of social institutions and 
circumstances, just as, as this Article has argued, twentieth century taxation 
has relied on the business firm and modern regulatory law.  To improve tax 
administration today, one needs to better understand what the most relevant 
factors determining compliance are today.  This Article has suggested a 
direction in which to look that is very different from prior scholarship. 
 
issues and challenges encountered by ridesharing service drivers). 
 237.  As some obvious examples: capital gains taxation may be replaced by mark-to-
market income taxation.  Better information about behavioral patterns of individuals may also 
lead to new forms of excise taxation.  
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CONCLUSION 
The arguments of this Article aim to enable one to see how modern 
governments can practice “taxation without information.”238  This is exactly 
the opposite of what some recent political economy scholarship (and much 
conventional wisdom within legal scholarship) suggests to be the basic logic 
of modern taxation.239  With no institutional foundation, it may be true that 
there can be “no taxation without information.”240  But modern taxation is 
not devoid of institutional foundation.  The co-evolution of business firms 
and systems of regulatory law in industrial economies is likely to have laid 
very robust foundations for compliance with the law, which enabled the 
United States and many countries to quickly increase their levels of taxation 
in the twentieth century, sometimes within the space of a few years,241 at a 
time when modern computing technology was still at its infancy. 
Modern taxation involves massive social cooperation: governments 
are put in place on the basis of systematic transfers of wealth.242  The 
deterrence model of tax compliance purports to explain taxpayers’ 
participation in such social enterprise by how they might be punished for 
free-riding.243  If social cooperation in general can be explained simply by 
reference to how free-riders are deterred, the social sciences would be in a 
very different place from where they stand today.244  Conversely, if the 
emergence of social cooperation in human societies cannot be explained by 
simple detection and punishment mechanisms, it is not clear why 
government and taxation should constitute an exception.  From this 
perspective, the Allingham and Sandmo theory of tax compliance is clearly 
inadequate, as is the insistence that recognizing the role of TPIR would 
salvage the Allingham and Sandmo model.  But merely identifying 
psychological attitudes that characterize normal, compliant taxpayers in 
advanced economies also does not do justice to the historical, cross-country, 
and even within-country variations in the level of tax compliance.  The 
understanding of tax compliance — and arguably of compliance with 
modern regulatory law in general — must be more firmly grounded in the 
understanding of a wider range of institutions. 
 
 
 238.  KKS, supra note 3, at 225 (Figure 2). 
 239.  See sources cited supra notes 12 and 16.  
 240.  Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2539.  
 241.  KKS, supra note 3, at 225 (Figure 2); supra note 41.  
 242.  See sources cited supra notes 2, 3. 
 243.  KKS, supra note 3; Allingham & Sando, supra note 162. 
 244.  See generally John E. Roemer, How we cooperate . . . perhaps (Apr. 2, 2015) 
(unpublished working paper, on file with Yale University) (providing a recent review of the 
social science literature on human cooperation). 
